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


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
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SOCIOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

ACCEPTING the general rule that the name by which a science is generally known marks an important epoch in its history, we may first consider the origin of the word sociology to indicate the science of society. We owe the name to Auguste Comte, and we owe to him the first explicit and complete demonstration of the fact that the methods which we apply to the study of other sciences, such as physics and chemistry, are strictly applicable to the science of society—that indeed none other are applicable. The term sociology is, of course, a hybrid, and has been objected to on that ground. It is derived from the Latin *socius*, a companion, and from the Greek *logos*, a science. This derivation, however, was defended by Comte on the ground that the word thus indicates the two great sources from which modern society is derived, Greece and Rome. The word was introduced into England by Comte's great admirer, John Stuart Mill. It was adopted by Herbert Spencer, and is now in general use everywhere. The older terms “social science” and “social philosophy” have been

superseded, and sociology is beginning to be recognised by the man in the street; though there are still some who think that it is a new-fangled term for socialism. But there were, of course, scientific students of society long before Comte, and indeed if we have formed any adequate conception of the scope of sociology we shall see that their name is legion. Every writer on manners and customs is, in so far as he is scientific, a sociologist; every writer on marriage, on law or jurisprudence, on philanthropy, on liberty, every writer on any department of politics—by which, of course, the last thing that is meant is that fatuity known as party politics. The reader will see that our science is so comprehensive that “all the books that might be written” could scarcely exhaust it. But it is certainly not our purpose to dispose of jurisprudence and polities, and all these other great topics, in such a short volume as this. Only certain aspects of sociology can be considered, and for perhaps the greater part of our space we shall confine ourselves to that which Mr. Lester Ward, the most distinguished American student of the subject, calls *pure sociology* as distinguished from *applied sociology*; but we must make at least some allusion to all these complex subjects, for the sake of insisting upon the great achievement which is implied in the invention and use of the word sociology. This great achievement is the recognition of the fact that there *is* a science of society. To this we must devote some space.

When we say that there is a science of any subject, what do we mean? Do we mean merely

that the subject admits of cataloguing?—that it includes a certain number of facts which can be tabulated? This is not an adequate reason for applying the dignified name of science to such a subject. The essential character of a science or of a subject that permits of scientific treatment is that it yields principles or laws. Many readers of this book will doubtless be prepared to admit that in the last resort such principles or laws are omnipresent. Many there are, however, who maintain that in certain spheres the facts are arbitrary, are not subject to the ordinary laws of causation, and are therefore necessarily incapable of scientific treatment. Those, for instance, who entertain the anthropomorphic conception of the Deity, or the derived notion of an arbitrary and conspicuously short-sighted—that is to say, improvident—Providence, necessarily deny the possibility of scientific treatment of such series of events as are supposed specially to interest these presiding powers. The petition for a particular kind of weather in the Book of Common Prayer thus implicitly denies the existence or the possibility of a science of meteorology; but it is chiefly in the realm of human action, of course, that the scientific idea is still regarded by some as inapplicable. For instance, the researches of such sociologists as Dr. J. G. Frazer are as idle tales to those who believe with the Vicar of Bray that—

Kings are by heaven appointed,
And damned all those who dare resist
Or touch the Lord's anointed.

Similarly, the researches of comparative mythology are nugatory to those who believe that all forms of religion are derived by degeneration or amplification from a primitive monotheism revealed by divine power. Then, again, the study of the rise and fall of nations is meaningless unless it be interpreted as due to natural—in this case psychological—causes, and not to the wrath or the favour of unseen powers.

The prime conception of sociology is that the actions of men are determined or determinable by causes which can be ascertained. In other words, sociology begins with an explicit denial of the doctrine that the human will is free or uncaused. Were it so, human actions would be unaccountable, whether in the individual or in the mass, and there could be no science of society in the sense in which we have defined a science. Certainly the actions of no individual are perfectly calculable, but when we take mankind in the gross we find that actions are calculable. This is the advantage of sociology over psychology.

The sociologist conceives that the prime fact which he has to study is human nature—human action in relation to the natural and the social environment. Thus sociology might almost be defined, in a sense, as the “psychology of the crowd.” It is concerned with the consequences of man’s mind or character or nature in his rôle as a social animal. Throughout the following pages we shall consistently hold to this conception, that the cardinal matter from beginning to end is human nature—that it is human nature which is responsible for

almost all the good of life and almost all the evil; for

the heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world.

When, therefore, the wise sociologist becomes prophetic or denunciatory or constructive, it is always upon human nature that his attention is focussed. If a political measure is proposed, the vital question for him is, "How will it affect the character of the people?" If the philosophic sociologist believes anything with all his heart and soul it is the profound truth of these words of Herbert Spencer:—

Of the ends to be kept in view by the legislator, all are unimportant compared with the end of character-making. . . . This alone is national education.

Nor will he confine his purview to the influence of human action in the past upon human action in the future. He is concerned with everything that moulds the character of men. Thus Buckle was a true sociologist when, in his "History of Civilisation in England," he attempted, with what success matters not, to estimate the "influence exercised by physical laws over the organisation of society and over the character of individuals." And Sir Archibald Geikie, our great geologist, is a sociologist when he attempts a similar task, as in his recent essays on "Landscape in History."

Whence it follows that sociology, in the filiation or sequence of the sciences, must necessarily follow upon psychology. This was recognised and taught

by the pioneer Comte, and by his successor, Herbert Spencer. Subsequent students have emphasised the vast influence of the social environment upon the mind and character of the individual man. Thus some of them are inclined to aver that sociology should be treated before psychology—on the grounds that there is no accounting for the psychology of the individual until we have attained a complete comprehension of the state of society in which he is placed. Granting that there is some truth in this, yet the speciousness of the contention that the Comte-Spencer arrangement should be reversed is surely apparent; for if we begin with sociology, pray how are we to account for any of its facts? No one will dispute that these facts are essentially the result of the interaction between human nature and external nature. Further, no one will dispute that psychology is prior in time and in logic, for the human mind is surely older than any human society. However far back we go in our search for the origins of human society, if even with Mr. Maclennan to a not improbable period when the semi-human, semi-simian ancestors of man first grouped themselves together into hordes, we are compelled to admit that the character of these hordes was determined by the characters of the individuals who formed and organised them. Therefore we maintain with the pioneers the logical and necessary priority of psychology to sociology, whilst at the same time we hope fully to recognise in the following pages the vast importance of the truth that the mind of man is profoundly reacted upon by those institutions and customs which

themselves have first taken origin therein. To this truth there is the corollary that men's natures at any given period are largely moulded and determined, not merely by the influence of heredity in the ordinary or strictly biological sense, but also by the influence of that external inheritance which is the peculiar birthright of the human infant. Whether a man's actions, resulting in the formation of habits or acquired characters, can be reproduced in his descendants, is extremely doubtful; but even if the answer be entirely negative, it is necessary to remember nevertheless that these habits do mould the nature of future generations in virtue of the change which they effect in the environment which those generations will inherit. Whatever beliefs as to heredity we may hold, we may be absolutely certain that causation is universal; that every action has its measure of consequence, great or small, to the uttermost times; that both the evil and the good men do live after them.

Many will be prepared to admit all or most of the foregoing, whilst yet denying the right of sociology to the name of a science. They argue that while sociology might be, and perhaps some day will be, a science, it is too much to say that it is a science already. They point to the disagreement of the professors, to the frequent non-fulfilment of their prophecies, to their varying definitions of the science itself, to their disputes as to its proper place in the classification of the sciences—and they say that really this will not do. However, judged by any absolute standard, all the sciences are incipient and tentative; and if the critics

cared to seek for conclusions on which sociologists are agreed, they would find that they are not so scanty as is supposed; and in any case, if there *can* be a science of anything, and if that subject is prosecuted in the scientific spirit, our labour cannot be in vain.

PART I

PURE SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNINGS OF SOCIETY

THE reader will see that we are prepared bodily to annex history as a mere branch of our subject. Indeed, the scientific conception of history is practically that of a combination of descriptive sociology with scientific biography. But of course the sociologist's conception of history is his own. It must not be confused with that collection of pointless gossip which only too often goes by the name of history, and which Spencer somewhere calls a record of royal misdemeanours. Furthermore, the sociologist attaches his own meaning to such a phrase as "the history of the world," by which, with astounding impudence, we usually mean merely the history, during a mere point of time, six or eight thousand years, of one particular colour of one particular animal, upon one particular planet, of one particular solar system. Thus for the sociologist history consists at the very least of the historical epoch and of as much as may be deciphered of prehistoric times. He includes as one both history and what we are now learning to call pre-history.

Indeed, sociology does much more than annex the whole of history and of historical anthropology. Its subject is *society*—not necessarily human society. Sociology begins with the beginning of any society. Now, in a previous volume we have read that, though we cannot deny sentience to the vegetable, yet we can find no signs therein of anything that answers to what we usually understand by consciousness. Thus, though there are certain vegetable societies, we may ignore them here. The *lichen*, for instance, is known by the botanist to be a double organism, half *alga*, half *fungus*. The *alga* does one sort of work which the *fungus* cannot do, and *vice versa*—both benefiting. This the biologist calls a case of symbiosis, and in a sense all societies are examples of symbiosis. But we may well confine ourselves to those cases where something that answers to conscious direction may be observed—in other words, to the animal world. In this little book there is no space to discuss at any length the fascinating subject of animal societies.¹

In any general discussion of biology and of organic evolution, we are apt to devote much praise to the step which was taken when the first vertebrate appeared, and we are apt to dismiss the invertebrates as immeasurably inferior to any back-boned animal. Yet it is the remarkable fact that when once we leave man it is amongst the inverte-

¹ The term comparative sociology usually denotes the study of the various types, past or present, of human society, but now that we recognise to the full the existence of societies amongst the lower animals, we may just as well use the term comparative sociology as parallel to the term comparative anatomy, which studies the structure of the lower animals and its relation to that of man.

brates that we find the most highly organised and efficient societies. No mammals save man, no birds or fishes or reptiles, display any social structure that can for one moment be named beside the societies of the social ants and bees and wasps.¹ These afford us examples of societies of extraordinary efficiency, orderly to a degree which we have never been able to emulate—though many of their individuals are incompetent or ne'er-do-wells, just as amongst ourselves—societies which exhibit a high degree of division of labour and of caste, societies some of which are even familiar with the institution of slavery. But fascinating and impressive as the comparative study of sociology doubtless is, its subjects are too remote and alien to be of any great value to us, who are chiefly interested, in this series at any rate, less with the study of sociology as an end in itself than with sociology and the sciences upon which it is based as the necessary preliminaries to any scientific study of the principles of morality. We leave therefore comparative sociology with but a passing word of regret.

Turning then to the origin of human or semi-human society, we briefly notice the existence of at least one celebrated error which affords an excellent index of the profound revolution which the evolutionary idea has wrought in all human thinking. This error is expressed in the phrase “social contract.” To parody it somewhat, we may say that once upon a time men were living scattered abroad here and there, until one day it simultaneously occurred to a number of them that it might pay

¹ See “Ants, Bees, and Wasps,” by Lord Avebury.

them remarkably well to enter into an agreement with one another; and thus the first society was formed. We see now, of course, that nothing of the sort ever happened. If we are really to get back to the origin of society, we will do well to determine the nature of the unit of society—its germ, if such there be. Now in Spencer's famous analogy, which is expressed in the phrase "social organism," the individual is the unit of the body politic, just as the cell is the unit of the individual body. But what we want to ascertain is the structure of the simplest form of social organism, the form analogous to the simplest form of animal organism. What is the simplest and smallest and most natural and fundamental fashion in which two or more individuals, whether human or semi-human, may band themselves together? It is assuredly the family. This is the basis and the unit of society; no family, no society. Therefore in our attempt to reconstruct the history of social institutions, it is our first concern to ascertain, if possible, the nature of the primitive family. This involves us in a study of the primitive sex-relation, and so important is this study that we must devote a special chapter to it.

CHAPTER II

SEX AND SOCIETY

It has been hastily and gratuitously assumed by many writers, myself amongst them, that promiscuity was the primitive form of human sex-

relation, and that men have gradually travelled from promiscuity through various forms of restriction to polyandry and polygamy, and finally to monogamy. The conclusion of this argument is that the perfect arrangement is the last to have been evolved—the union of one husband to one wife—and certainly I am not about to dispute the immeasurable superiority of this relation over any other; but that may well be admitted without assuming that the sequence of events has been in accordance with the statements of these writers. It is indeed quite a delusion to suppose that monogamy, the union permanent—save for formal divorce—of one husband with one wife, is a late product of evolution, a novelty. Perhaps this delusion has been developed in the course of attempting to find a natural or rational explanation for institutions which had formerly been accounted for on miraculous grounds. We used to be taught, for instance, that marriage, by which is meant monogamic marriage, is an institution of divine origin, as is partly implied in the seventh and tenth commandments. This idea has been fostered by the Church, doubtless partly in the interests of society, but indeed no student of the subject can now entertain it.

For we are quite familiar with monogamy amongst the lower animals. It is quite well known amongst the birds. Furthermore, when we come to look at those animal species which are most nearly related to the animal ancestors of man, we find it to be a libel upon them to assert that their sexual relation is promiscuity. This inquiry cannot be pursued further here, but at any rate we may be assured

that monogamy is far older than many have thought it. This is a matter of practical importance, for monogamy has lately been subjected to a great deal of criticism on the part of many students, and some of us suspect that many of these have been interested not so much to attack any particular marital institution as to attack through it the ecclesiastical institutions which are supposed by them to have invented monogamy. If some of these gentlemen thoroughly realised that monogamy, like morality itself, is of almost inconceivably greater antiquity than any church or creed, their hostility to it would very probably be modified.

The study of the history of marriage and the various forms of matrimonial institutions has lately occupied a great number of anthropologists. The most distinguished living student of the subject is Dr. Westermarck.¹ Dr. Westermarck and his contemporaries have shown that the history of matrimonial institutions has not followed any such precise and logical course as used to be assumed—notably by his master, Spencer. Matrimonial institutions are largely determined by local conditions. For instance, where there is constant fighting, and therefore a deficiency of men (which means a relative preponderance of women), there is almost always

¹ It is one of the services of the lately formed Sociological Society, and of the University of London, to have wiled away Dr. Westermarck from his native Finland, and to have given his science the advantages which will accrue from his being placed in a position which affords him greater opportunities for teaching and for research. Dr. Westermarck is the first, and, at the time of writing, the only man, to hold any academic post in sociology in any university in Great Britain—Great Britain of which Herbert Spencer was the son.

encountered polygamy, which always means a relatively degraded position of woman. Hence, as was demonstrated by Spencer—that lifelong opponent of militarism and upholder of monogamy—there is an almost necessary relation between militancy and the degradation of woman. In other conditions, polyandry (the having many husbands—often brothers—by one wife) is found to be prevalent. But it is quite certain that sheer promiscuity is amongst the very rarest of all matrimonial institutions, if indeed it can be called an institution. We have no positive evidence that promiscuity had not been universally or almost universally superseded before the emergence of any creature which its present descendants would care to recognise as human.

It is not to our present purpose to discuss the many forms of prohibitions and encouragements with which sexual relations have been surrounded in different times.¹ We are concerned here especially with the genesis of the forms of society in which we find ourselves. We are concerned with what we may regard as the main lines of ascent or advance, not with the many little divagations which, so to speak, led to nowhere. Thus, having found that monogamy may quite fairly be regarded as no less primitive to man than any other form of sexual relation—though, of course, we recognise that it is most constantly met with in the highest societies—we may confine ourselves to the consideration of its consequences. The essential character of monogamy

¹ Such are endogamy and exogamy (the necessity to marry only within or without the limits of the tribe), taboo, caste, the enforcement of celibacy, and so forth.

from the point of view of the sociologist is the relative or absolute permanence of the relation. Even where polygamy is practised, with permanence of the marriage tie subject to the laws of divorce, the sociologist still finds a type of family which he can recognise as a more or less fit basis for social institutions. Thus, in Salt Lake City, polygamy is, or was until quite recently, compatible with the existence of a state of society that closely resembled our own. But we may confine ourselves to the consideration of the permanent monogamic relation, ignoring the polygamic relation as relatively unimportant. Of course the chief importance of monogamy from the point of view of the sociologist lies in its consequences for the children. The essence of the permanent relation, and of its confinement, and of its limitations, is that it results in the production of a stable family. Further, on the average this type of family may be repeated indefinitely, so to speak, in a given society without "leaving anything over"; that is to say, the number of the sexes is approximately so equal that no great number of men or women will be left unmated.¹ This is the

¹ As every one knows, the "superfluous woman" exists in this country to the extent of over a million—a fact by no means jocular. The superfluous man, if he existed, could not be regarded as offering any serious criticism on monogamy, since he can well support himself. The position of the superfluous woman, on the other hand, is really a very grave criticism on monogamy. In this connection it may be noted that so far as "nature" is concerned, this criticism does not arise. There are more boys than girls born, in the ratio of about 104 to 100, but, through the operation of various causes, we find the proportion reversed at the marriage ages. It is not enough to say, I fear, that the economic position of women is so rapidly improving that the superfluous woman is nowadays

great advantage of monogamy as compared with polygamy or polyandry in any society where the number of the sexes is approximately equal. The argument will not hold, however, that this approximate equality in the number of the sexes is a demonstration of nature's preference for monogamy, for such an equality would as readily support the relation of promiscuity.

Having gone so far, it remains for us to consider the present state of the question concerning this institution of marriage, which we have come to regard as the fundamental institution of society—older even than law and religion.

We quite admit that it does not suffice, when defending monogamy, to point to its existence amongst the lower animals, or to the frequency with which it has been practised amongst early human societies—still less to assert that monogamy must be the ideal state, simply because we think it so. It is the business of constructive sociology to

becoming quite independent; for, in the first place, the actual amount of energy which is normally available by the female body is very considerably less than that which is at the service of the male. This inclines us to believe that woman, in so far as she continues to be really feminine, and not merely sexless, can never attain to an economic equality with man; but even if she could, I should still continue to deny that the existence of the superfluous woman and the observed and continuous fall in the marriage-rate are not to be deplored. If there is anything quite certain, it is that the normal destiny of a woman is to be a mother, and that any woman, however otherwise successful, who has not achieved this station, has essentially failed. It is impossible to calculate how much feminine ill-health of mind and body, how much unhappiness, are due to this simple fact, that a constantly increasing number of women, many of them deliberately, but many more of them without their choice, are thus failing in life. (See p. 35.)

consider and attempt to appraise all the criticisms to which any social institution is subjected, and furthermore, to state, if possible, the most perfect form in which such an institution should be moulded and maintained.

The critics who seek to amend our present marriage customs have certainly this excuse for their efforts, that marriage, as we know it, is indeed far from being an unqualified success. From this it does not follow that marriage is therefore a failure: nor does it follow that any more successful mode of sexual relations can be devised; nor does it even follow that marriage is responsible for its failures. A sociologist of our way of thinking, imbued as he is with the belief that human nature is the one essential factor in all social problems, never reads such a phrase as the "failure of marriage" or the "failure of democracy" without remembering that what these really mean is the failure of human nature under certain conditions, or, if you please, the failure of certain conditions to ameliorate human nature. Many critics think, however, that when they have pointed out some evil concomitant of marriage their case is complete. But this will not do. I have heard it said, for instance, that marriage is condemned because it can only survive by the aid of the 70,000 unfortunate women who walk the streets of London. I have heard it said that these women are the product of our marriage system. This, of course, is grossly untrue. But even were it admitted, it would not in the least follow that monogamic marriage might not be productive of fewer such women than any other system of sexual

relation. The present-day critics of marriage, however, never really go further than merely to assert, in a rather higher key than usual, the existence of those evils with which every one who has left school is familiar. When these critics attempt construction, they never seem to think beyond the first step. They are unaware of the truth of that axiom so constantly insisted upon by Herbert Spencer, that, whilst the politician or the man in the street may content himself with estimating the immediate consequences, the sociologist must never be content until he has attempted to estimate ultimate consequences.

Let us now consider—with an eye upon remote consequences upon character—one or two of the vexed questions of marriage of the present day.¹ First we must devote a word to the vastly important subject of divorce, which is essential in the study of modern marriage, and a right understanding of which will be highly conducive to the continuance and success of this great institution.

We may recognise two extremes of practice in this matter amongst modern civilised peoples. (It is not necessary here to discuss the forms and laws of divorce that are met with in savage tribes, though it may be worth while to note how universally the necessity of divorce is appreciated.) At the one extreme is the practice of the Church, a practice still maintained by the Roman Catholic

¹ The following pages should not properly be included under the heading “pure sociology”; but it is more convenient not to defer our consideration of marriage as a problem of to-day to the subsequent part of this book, which deals mainly with “applied sociology.”

Church. This consists in the absolutely unqualified prohibition of divorce in every case. "Whom God hath joined, let no man put asunder": not even though he be the priest himself. In justice, we must admit that this prohibition may well have been designed in the highest interests of marriage; but, at the same time, we are compelled to deny that it can possibly be regarded as having been always successful. It proceeded on the assumption that God had indeed joined together every married pair—an assumption too grotesque for discussion. Indeed, so palpably have some marriages not been "made in heaven," that, in such cases, Oscar Wilde's joke becomes almost a serious truth—of such marriages the "divorces are made in heaven." Until recently, divorce was impossible to those married by the Church in France, and the playgoer is familiar with dramas designed to show the terrible disasters which often ensued. The sociologist, who regards marriage as essentially not a religious but a civil contract, must maintain that, in the highest interests of marriage itself, the complete dissolution of marriages that should never have been contracted must be possible.

At the other extreme, we find the facility of divorce that occurs, to their shame, in certain States of the American Republic, wherein it has been recorded that a woman had been married to and divorced from the same man on three successive occasions, meanwhile contracting other so-called marriages.¹ Obviously this would be a mere burlesque

¹ In 1904 the record was 612 divorces out of each 10,000 marriages.

of marriage—were it not tragic. Already it has excited protest from Mr. Roosevelt among others.

It is evident that the knowledge of such abominable facility of divorce must affect persons who propose to marry, and must thus lead to alliances which have nothing to recommend them, whilst the fate of the children of such marriages is only too apparent. Hence even the sociologist, who considers the matter without any dogmatic prepossession, and purely from the secular point of view, is compelled to condemn such facilities of divorce without reservation. The laws of divorce that obtain in this country stand about as high in the estimation of the scientific student as most of our legal enactments.¹

Far worse in its consequences than even such facilities for divorce would be the adoption of a recent proposal, too contemptibly silly for even the barest allusion, were it not that it proceeded from the mouth of one so celebrated as Mr. George Meredith. This irresponsible amateur actually expressed the opinion to the readers of the *Daily Mail* that men should adopt "leasehold marriage," the children being looked after by the "State"—that is to say, by other people than their parents.

Apparently Mr. Meredith has not read the great defence of true monogamy on purely philosophic grounds by the major thinker of our time. He did not ask himself whether the children of these so-called marriages would benefit or not by being handed over to the State ere they were into their

¹ The history of divorce is treated in great detail in the "History of Matrimonial Institutions," by Dr. G. E. Howard, of the University of Chicago. (London: Fisher Unwin.)

teens. The author of "Richard Feverel" apparently does not consider that the parent is Nature's appointed educator of his child, nor is he acquainted with the statistical facts as to the future of children who lose the advantage of this priceless provision. He did not ask himself *for what* men would marry under the new conditions. Plainly it would not be for the love which sets a man's soul among the stars; or for the joys of parenthood; or for high comradeship, ripening with the years; or, indeed, for anything, as far as one can see, but the satisfaction of the irritability of certain well-defined areas of grey matter near the tail-end of the spinal cord.

Could a ten-year understanding be rightly termed marriage? What would be the essential distinction, if any, between such "marriage" and legalised prostitution? That is an inquiry which may be recommended to the advocates of the new method—one of those "new" things which one had thought to have been buried for ever in certain geological strata of the "good old days." (Leasehold marriage, or its equivalent, is known, however, amongst certain of the lower animals, and also amongst certain very rude and degraded savages.)

"The most dangerous thing in the world," said Goethe, "is ignorance in motion"; and his distinguished admirer has set ignorance in motion. Incidentally he must have distressed thousands of good women, wives and mothers, and many of his own admirers as well.

But we need not be alarmed. A writer in the *Spectator* said of this suggestion, "If it is serious, a more mischievous one was never flung broadcast

among a miscellaneous audience." But the past has not passed in vain. No counsel which proposes, as this does, to abolish marriage, the family, and the State, and all that hangs upon them, has any chance of more than an ephemeral success. Proposals to injure human character, and to aid in the propagation of children by the least-developed morally, will be treated with the contempt they deserve. One decade of experience would convince those who are so immeasurably blind that they cannot see the truth when it is as patent as the sun at noonday.

One other point may briefly be dealt with here, and that is concerned with restrictions to marriage. I do not here refer to those highly desirable restrictions upon at any rate productive marriages, which will be placed by the society of the future upon the unions of the "born criminal," the insane, and those afflicted with certain forms of disease; but to the restrictions of relationship.

The Roman Catholic Church forbids the marriage¹ of first, second, and even third cousins. Elsewhere there exists a very general prejudice against the marriage of first cousins at any rate. It is supposed that the offspring of such marriages are apt to be weak in mind or body or both. If this were so, certainly no believer in eugenics could do other than applaud such a eugenic restriction. But the prejudice against the marriage of first cousins—and *à fortiori* against that of second or third cousins—

¹ Nominally, that is to say. A dispensation is always readily obtained.

is quite ill-founded; or at any rate, is entirely unsupported by any positive evidence. This being so, it may be doing a service to some to state the fact here.

CHAPTER III

THE PLACE OF WOMAN IN SOCIETY

IN the previous chapter we have seen that some measure of injustice has been done to early man in our notions of his sexual relations; and now it appears that some apology is also due to him on the score that we have generally believed his treatment of his womankind to have been consistently execrable. Any one, however, who cares to read Dr. Westermarck's paper on "The Position of Woman in Early Civilisation"¹ will discover how erroneous many of our generalisations have been. It is not correct to imagine that the position of women among primitive races is always one of abject slavery. Even amongst the Australian aborigines, "who have long been reputed to be perhaps the greatest oppressors of women on earth," it is found that a wife has rights which were entirely unknown to the first students of these peoples. Nor is it quite true to say that primitive man made of his women beasts of burden, and allotted to them all the drudgery. It may be shown that there was in reality a division of labour which, though doubtless affected by man's egoism, was not so entirely unfair as has been supposed. It used to be argued,

¹ Published in "Sociological Papers." (Macmillan.)

we remember, that savages are polygamous—polygamy of course implying the degradation of woman. But now we know that many savages are strictly monogamous; and that even where polygamy occurs it is confined to the minority of the people, the vast majority being monogamous.

On the other hand, the once popular theory of Bachofen, which inferred a past period of matriarchy, or actual supremacy of woman, from the fact that descent was often traced through the mother, is nowadays held by no one. It is seen that the tracing of descent through the mother depended upon the dubiety that often attached to the child's paternity. No sociologist now believes that there ever was a stage of matriarchy or rule by women.

As to the causes which determine the exceedingly various status of woman in different societies very little is known. It has been shown, however, that woman is usually treated with more respect when she directly aids in the obtaining of food. Thus she stands higher where the tribe lives on fish or roots, or where its activities are agricultural. But amongst pastoral or hunting communities woman stands lower, apparently because she is unable to contribute to the feeding of the tribe.

Again, some exception, at any rate as regards very lowly civilisations, must be taken to the rule, often asserted, that a people's civilisation may be measured by the status of its womankind. So many exceptions are furnished to this rule that really there is little of it left. Further, Dr. Westermarck shows that the tendency of the great religions to treat women as unclean has injured their

status even amongst the Chinese, the Hindus, the Hebrews, and the Mohammedans. In his original paper Dr. Westermarck also criticised the generally received opinion that the rise of Christianity coincided with and caused a great improvement in the *status* of woman, and showed that the opinions held of woman by many of the early Fathers tended to her debasement ; but, for some reason or other, these remarks do not appear in the printed version of his paper. But the essential conclusion which we may note is that, contrary to the generally received opinion, among some uncivilised races the position of woman is "undoubtedly very bad ; amongst others it is extremely good ; and, generally speaking, it is much better than it is commonly supposed to be." We may correlate this conclusion with the facts already noted as to the great antiquity of monogamy and the relative unimportance of polygamy and, still more, of promiscuity in early societies.

We must now turn to a consideration of the present position of woman in society. The reader will do me the justice to assume that I include a brief discussion of this subject in order to emphasise its importance, and not because I am under the delusion that it can adequately be dealt with in a brief chapter, or, indeed, in anything but a lengthy treatise.

With regard to our own times, we may incline to accept the truth of the dictum that the *status* of woman is not a bad index of the *status* of any given civilisation, even though we have just seen that this

generalisation does not hold entirely true of early society. Further, we may declare that every step which tends towards the elevation of woman is indisputably a step in advance. And here we are confronted with a difficulty.

As biologists we are convinced, as has already been stated, that the process of the "physiological division of labour" (to quote the invaluable phrase first introduced by the French physiologist Henri Milne-Edwards) has resulted in the definite allotment to woman of the greater share in the supremely important function of reproduction. Further, the physicians assure us that, as far as their observation is concerned, women tend very frequently to "go wrong" physically when this function remains undischarged by them. As a rule, they say—there are, doubtless, many exceptions—a woman who fails to become a mother has failed in life; and this failure is apt to express itself in disastrous fashion.

But, on the other hand, if woman is to take the place in society to which we declare that she is entitled, she must be permitted the fullest opportunities for intellectual development. And already a difficulty is seen to arise. For there appears to be, at any rate in the present stage, some measure of incompatibility between intellectual development and true femininity.¹ The physician finds, for instance, that the woman dedicated to intellectual pursuits is apt to lose certain feminine characters. It is noticed that an important function discharged

¹ Fortunately we are able to point to not a few brilliant exceptions, where women of great intellectual powers are also the mothers of large and thriving families, which tend to inherit them.

by the female organism, and connected with the reproductive function, is frequently found to disappear in women who enter the universities. No injury results to the individual organism certainly, but the woman has, nevertheless, lost somewhat of her femininity. Thus the question arises, how far the development of woman's intellectual faculties and intellect is consistent with the retention of her essential femininity—which is a very important matter. The physician finds that women are apparently tending, even with the best intentions in the world, to lose the power of nursing their children. He finds that the whole of the reproductive functions is apparently becoming more difficult of discharge by civilised woman. He seems to find, further, that she is even losing the *desire* to discharge them. Now no one and nothing else can take her place.

But for myself I am optimistic enough to believe that we need not infer from these facts the necessary incompatibility of woman's intellectual and sexual development. I believe that in great measure the present defects observed in her sexual development are due not merely or mainly, if at all, to her increasing measure of intellectual development, nor even to her increasing share in the affairs of the world, but very largely to city life and to the false ideals of the time—ideals for which man as well as woman is largely responsible. Nevertheless, it does appear that there is a natural limit set to the intellectual and commercial development of woman. That limit is set by the fact that she has other functions to discharge which necessarily entail the

consumption of a large part of her physical energy. We have already noted that her actual output of physical energy seems to be definitely fixed as less than that of man. The student of physics will recall the difference recognised between kinetic energy — the energy of movement and action — and potential energy, which is none the less real because it is less evident. Now woman, in virtue of her duties in regard to reproduction, seems to tend rather to the accumulation of potential energy than to the output of kinetic energy. Or, to quote the language of the physiologist, the functions of the female organism are *anabolic*, or *building up*, rather than *katabolic*, or *breaking down*. In this respect woman is contrasted with man. Hence, if she is to continue to discharge those anabolic functions, consisting in the accumulation of potential energy for her unborn children, upon which the continuance of the race depends, there is a very definite and necessary limit set to her external activities, to that output of kinetic energy which depends upon what the physiologist calls *katabolism*. *If woman is to continue to be woman, she cannot compete on equal terms with man in so far as external activities are concerned.* If she attempts to become man and woman too, she is apt to end by failing to be either.

On the other hand, we have abundant proof that woman's intellectual development, duly contrived and adjusted, may be and often is perfectly compatible with the retention of her womanliness, both physical and psychical. It would be a bad lookout were this not so. For one thing, the intellectual

development of the race is certainly to be hastened by the provision of intellectual mothers as well as intellectual fathers. It would be a vast pity if the intellectual women were necessarily debarred from transmitting their intellectual powers to posterity. Again, the intellectual development of women is becoming more and more necessary in the interests of marriage. Educated men are nowadays not content to marry dolls. They want intellectual as well as physical companionship. If they cannot get all they desire in one woman, they are apt to become discontented with the monogamic restriction. We may remember the brilliant *hetairae* of Greece.

On all these counts, then, and on many more, I am an earnest advocate of the higher education of women—this, though as a physician I am not unacquainted with the various counts on which my profession may frame an indictment against it. But surely enough has been said to show that the utmost precautions are necessary. More students than one in the United States have shown how disastrous the higher education of women when injudiciously conducted may be; and certainly if the higher education of women were to destroy womanliness, it would destroy not only the possibility of human life, but almost all that makes that life worth living.

That women will ultimately get what they want in this matter I have no doubt whatever. But future ages will record, to the lasting disgrace of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, that in A.D. 1905 those great academic institutions con-

tinued to refuse, even to the most brilliant women, the degrees which are freely conferred upon masculine mediocrity—and worse.¹

In the preceding paragraphs I have endeavoured to express the conviction that the insistence upon the importance of the education of women is really an insistence upon a measure of great significance to the sociologist. The argument has been that such education is compatible with the retention of womanliness, though it imperils it when injudiciously conducted; that it is of great importance in its bearing upon marriage, first, because of the altering character of the male requisites in a wife, and secondly, because of the intellectual value to future generations of intellectuality in their mothers in virtue of the laws of heredity. Finally, I would insist that such education is of the first importance in enabling woman to take her proper economic place in society. But on this point there must be no misunderstanding. I have italicised the assertion, based on physiological *data*, that, in general, woman cannot compete with man so far as external activities are concerned without loss of her all-important womanliness. If this proposition be true—and it is supported by the most unquestionable facts of observation—it must never be forgotten as the essential fact with which those who labour for the establishment of an economic equality between the sexes must reckon. It implies that such an

¹ People who feel strongly upon this matter are delighted to see that Trinity College, Dublin, is now prepared to confer Arts Degrees upon women who have qualified for them at Oxford or Cambridge. Perhaps the financial argument will convince those who are unaffected by mere considerations of justice or decency.

economic equality is unattainable : this not because woman is of less inherent worth to Society than man, but because her characteristic powers are not of economic value, as that term is usually understood. But it is surely evident that, rightly considered, woman's economic value—in the highest sense—is at least equal to that of man. For her functions, in regard to the production and nourishment and upbringing of children, are absolutely indispensable to every society, past, present, and to come. It is true to the uttermost that "the hand that rocks the cradle rules the world."

Hence the falling birth-rate of civilised peoples (Russia and Japan excepted) is a phenomenon of the very first sociological importance. The physician is able to discount this as due, in fact, to the dissemination of knowledge which, in certain conditions, may perhaps be rightfully applied. The biologist, under the guidance afforded by Spencer's discovery of the "law of multiplication," which asserts that the rate of increase of organisms is in inverse ratio to the individual development, is able still further to discount it, and to hail it as, in part, an accompaniment and consequence of the higher standard of the individual life. But, even after these allowances are made, there remains the fact, which is unfortunately not a mere matter of inference, that many women of to-day are deliberately refusing to perform the high function which is theirs.

In how far the falling marriage-rate implies that women who might marry, and who would have married when women were less dependent, are

deliberately refusing to marry, I cannot say. If it were to be demonstrated that the rise in the economic position of woman were having such a consequence the fact would be deplorable.

The reader will observe that I have raised many more questions than I have attempted to answer, but I have failed egregiously if he has not been convinced of their importance; and at any rate I beseech him to ponder upon what I believe to be the most important fact enunciated in this chapter—that woman cannot enter into economic competition with man on level terms, save at a cost which is incalculably too high.

In days to come the value of the maternal function will be more adequately appreciated by Society: and thus a great difficulty under which women labour will be removed. It will be perceived, for instance, that the pregnant woman is already performing arduous work of supreme importance, and she will be expected to perform no more. The conditions that now obtain in many parts of this country, and notably in Lancashire, will be no longer permitted. In Switzerland no pregnant woman or nursing woman is allowed to work for several weeks before or after her confinement. Again I say that if the establishment of municipal *crèches* is necessary, as would appear, in the present condition, there is something rotten in the State and at its very heart. I venture to predict that a part of the practical religion of the future will consist in something not far short of the apotheosis of maternity.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOCIAL ORGANISM

WE owe the phrase which gives its title to this chapter to Herbert Spencer, who employed it in his first book, "Social Statics," published in 1850. The analogy between society and an organism had, of course, been frequently observed by many of his predecessors,¹ as the phrase "body-politic" alone suggests. But Spencer's discussion of the analogy was the first to give it real worth, and some aspects of it must be discussed here, whilst special attention must be paid to one outstanding difference of cardinal importance that always obtains, and always must obtain, between the social and the individual organism.²

A society is an entity with attributes like those of a living body; and the analogy between the two depends on the resemblance between the permanent relations among the parts of a society, and the permanent relations among the parts of a living body. A society, like an organism, undergoes continuous growth; and as it grows, its parts become unlike. That is to say, it undergoes an increase in complexity of structure. It not merely grows, but develops. The various parts become mutually dependent—the soldier upon the farmer, the farmer upon the soldier, and so forth. Hence the individual and the social organism correspond precisely in regard

¹ Notably by Plato and by Hobbes, the first of the long line of illustrious students of society which this country has produced.

² See especially "The Principles of Sociology," chapter xix.

to the "physiological division of labour." Every living organism is essentially composed of living units or cells. The unit of the social organism may be variously regarded as the individual or the family.¹ But the life of the whole is quite unlike the lives of the units, though it is produced by them. Later, we shall see the all-important distinction between the life of a society and the life of an individual organism. It is "by emotional and intellectual language" that the social aggregate is rendered a living whole.

Each kind of organism develops systems of organs. The first differentiation, in the case of the individual organism, is into inner and outer.² The latter is concerned with the environment, the former with the internal functions of the organism. Similarly, in the evolution of social organisms we find the early appearance of the masters or warriors, who are concerned with the environment, and the slaves who perform the internal functions of the organism. And in each kind of organism there must soon appear a distributing mechanism ; roads and traders, or blood-vessels and blood-cells and blood-serum. Similarly, each must have a regulating system—the nervous system and its agents, the law and its administrators.

Further analogies will readily occur at almost any length to the reader. We need not discuss them here.

But we must gravely note the cardinal difference

¹ According to Sir Henry Maine the unit of an ancient society was the family, whilst the unit of a modern society is the individual.

² See "The Evolution of Mind" in the volume "Psychology."

between the two kinds of organisms. In the one, consciousness is concentrated in a small part of the aggregate ; and is *one*, though the organism consist of billions on billions of cells. But in the social organism, consciousness is diffused throughout the aggregate, and is always multiple. All the units possess the capacities for happiness and misery in almost equal degree. Therefore, as there is no social centre of sentiency, the welfare of the aggregate, considered apart from that of the units, is not an end to be sought. The "State" has no consciousness of its own, and therefore the welfare of the State never means anything more or other than the welfare of the citizens. From the individual organism an entire limb may be amputated, without heed to *its* happiness, for the benefit of the single consciousness which it subserves ; but there is no such consciousness to consider in the case of the social organism.

Thus, at the most important point, the analogy breaks completely down, and the fact that it does so must never be forgotten. Its relation to present tendencies in sociology is, as Mr. Benjamin Kidd says, "probably fundamental." In the individual organism it is necessary that the lives of the units be merged in the life of the whole, but in a society, as Spencer says, "the living units do not and cannot lose individual consciousness, since the community as a whole has no corporate consciousness." "This is an everlasting reason why the welfare of citizens cannot rightly be sacrificed to some supposed benefit of the State ; but why, on the other hand, the State is to be maintained solely for the benefit of the citizens. The corporate life must here be subser-

vient to the lives of the parts, instead of the lives of the parts being subservient to the corporate life." This assertion of Spencer's is fundamentally opposed to the Greek theory of society, which is expressed also in Roman law. According to this, "the citizen was nothing, except as a member of the State. His whole existence depended on and was subject to the State. The State knew neither moral nor legal limits to its power."

This assertion of the importance of the individual and the absolute nonentity of the interests of the State, save in so far as they are the interests of the individual, is of the very first importance, because it is essentially a democratic assertion. In ancient States no more than in modern ones was there a corporate consciousness. The individual was not sacrificed to an abstraction or a theory when he was sacrificed for the State. Not at all: he was sacrificed for the pleasure and power and prosperity of *other individuals*—the individuals of the ruling classes. The reader may carefully consult Mr. Kidd's attempt to amplify and correct Spencer's theory of the "social organism," and to account for this "difficulty" in the analogy; but I doubt whether he will obtain from Mr. Kidd's interesting writings any clear recognition of what I conceive the difference between the ancient and the modern theory of the State really to mean. The theory that the individual exists for the State means that he existed for certain other individuals. It was a theory of oligarchy. The fact that the State has no corporate consciousness was never denied either in Greece or Rome. The individual was sacrificed for

the benefit of no such non-existent consciousness, but for the benefit of the consciousness of a few more fortunate individuals. The Spencerian assertion of the rights of the individual against the State is essentially an assertion of the principle of democracy. It is an assertion that the welfare of the few—which is what the welfare of the State really meant—is not to be attained at the cost of the welfare of the many. Thus I hold that the real practical importance of the phrase the “social organism” lies in the fact, that the implied analogy breaks down so signally on the most important particular, and thus brings into prominence a principle which is the fundamental principle of democracy.

CHAPTER V

THE ORIGIN OF THE PROFESSIONS

IT may be conceived that in the most primitive societies all men were equal; but it is evident that twenty-four hours after the formation of such a society, some one would have taken the lead, simply in virtue of the fact that—the supposed basis of democracy notwithstanding—all men are not born free and equal, but that some are predestined to follow and some to lead, one to be a hammer and another an anvil. Now the leader of a primitive society was practically its king; and the sociologist is much interested in attempting to discover the manner in which the institution of kingship arose.

It used to be generally thought that the early

king was simply the bravest and biggest and strongest man of his tribe; in other words, that the first kind of superiority was muscular. That this would be so in a primitive state of society seemed probable to many. But Dr. J. G. Frazer, the celebrated author of the "Golden Bough," has adduced reasons for thinking that this view was erroneous. He finds that, if we attempt to infer the evolution of the kingship in early society from the facts of the primitive societies now extant, we must conclude that the first kind of superiority was not muscular but mental. According to him, the oldest of all professional classes was composed of medicine-men or magicians. These are the members of primitive societies who claim to have powers over nature which are denied to the vulgar. Plainly they make good this claim in the eyes of their fellows by virtue of superior intellectual power. In various parts of Australasia—which affords the anthropologist so many more facts of importance than any other region of the world to-day—it is found that the medicine-man precedes the king or chief, and that the older class tends to develop into the later. In other words, the primitive king is a magician who has gained the place of leader in virtue of the magical powers which are attributed to him. The African continent furnishes recent instances of the complete evolution of the kingship from the institution of the magician. Hence we may say that the early king was the cleverest man of his tribe. Dr. Frazer has further shown that the belief in the magical powers of kings has died hard. We hint at it when we speak of the "sovereign touch," which was supposed to cure the "king's evil"—

now known to be a form of tuberculosis best treated by the touch not of the sovereign but of the surgeon. Many such beliefs still survive even in modern Europe. But whilst we fully recognise the superstition and the ignorance upon which depended the success of the medicine-man, and thus the evolution of the kingship, we must remember Dr. Frazer's conclusion, that "the rise of monarchy was an essential condition of the emergence of mankind from savagery."¹

But "the king as magician" represents only the first stage in the evolution of the kingship. For after a time the belief in magic began to decay. Of course, I do not mean to assert that it disappeared altogether; but it will readily be conceded that pretensions which were lies from beginning to end could scarcely be maintained without some defect as men slowly began to accumulate observations which were incompatible with them. Thus the king gradually came to assume a new character. There arose the primitive form of theological belief, which was, of course, polytheistic. Dr. Frazer calls this the "growth of religion," but we may accept this term only for convenience, and not without losing sight of the distinction enforced by his great master, Herbert Spencer, between superstition and religion. Thus the king—as well as other exceptional persons—came to be looked upon as divine—as an incarnation of a deity. Dr. Frazer quotes a very large number of instances, from Polynesia, Africa, ancient Europe, modern

¹ In preparing this chapter I am much indebted to two delightful lectures which Dr. Frazer delivered at the Royal Institution in May 1905.

India and China, and elsewhere, of the belief in divine kings. Such beliefs were held also in Babylon and Egypt and amongst the Incas of Peru. A modified form of this belief would naturally tend to occur in course of time. It was asking more than modified credulity could grant to assert that the contemporary monarch was himself immediately divine; but it could credibly be accepted that he was of divine descent. As every one knows, this belief is still held by the majority of the Japanese concerning their Mikado. A later stage in the evolution of the kingship was plainly the belief that the monarch, though not himself divine, or even of divine descent, at any rate reigned by "divine right." It remained for Carlyle to mark the end of this belief in his fine assertion that the divine right of kings is "the divine right to be kingly men." So much for the origin and history of the kingship until the decline of absolute monarchy—which is, of course, the only kind of monarchy that properly deserves the name.

Let us now return to that which we have agreed is the primitive professional class. We have seen that the first differentiation of any such class consisted in the formation of a class of the exceptionally clever medicine-men or magicians. We have seen, further, that from this class there were developed the early kings. From it also, as we may guess, were developed two other professional classes of very great importance; between whom has been war until this day. From the medicine-man were derived not only the kings but also the priests and the men of science.

Let us see how this would happen. The medicine-man or magician professed to have the power of controlling or modifying the course of external nature. Notably he was a rain-maker. From him there would naturally evolve that class of persons whose business it is to study nature and to attempt to understand it—men of science. There also grew up, as we shall see in the next chapter, a belief in the existence of various personal powers in nature—spirits of the departed, deities, and so forth. The medicine-man professed not only to control the course of inanimate nature, but also to have the power of exorcising or scaring away such spirits as were suspected of malign intentions. Notably were these spirits considered to be responsible for sudden death and for disease of all kinds. Hence the medicine-man came to answer more or less to the notion which that term now suggests to us. He was the primitive physician as well as the primitive meteorologist in virtue of his rain-making powers. Hence we reach the more or less distinct evolution of a scientific class. But from the medicine-man or physician there also descended, it would appear, another class, the existence of which depended upon the growth of the beliefs in spirits and in deities. This was the primitive priestly class. Its members were on specially friendly terms with the unseen powers. Their intercession was sought in order to appease or gain the favour of such powers. In general their principle, as we may imagine, was conciliatory. They had gained the favour of the spirits. On the other hand, the principle of the primitive scientist was antagonistic.

He was on no friendly terms with the spirits, but he claimed to have the whip hand of them.

Which things, I think, are a parable. Of course I do not assert that this sequence was constantly followed in the evolution of early society, nor that the account I have given is any more than a highly generalised and highly speculative one. But we may probably take it that the men of science and the theologians are of very nearly equal antiquity, though the former perhaps have slightly the advantage. We may take it, further, that there is a distinct antagonism between their methods and their assumptions. The essence of the attitude of the theologian, of whatever age, or place, or creed, is conciliatory. He asserts that we are all at the mercy of higher powers, whom it is our business to supplicate and wheedle. He inclines to assert that any independent efforts of our own are futile, if not impious and highly dangerous, as tending to excite a not unnatural irritation in the powers that be. He therefore holds that it is the business of men to abase themselves, and to strive for protection against pestilence and drought and famine through the intervention of those favoured few who, whether by birthright or in virtue of long apprenticeship, have become possessed of special powers as suppliants of the unseen persons, and as interpreters of their will.

In this chapter, which deals only with beginnings, we will not trace the kingship or the history of the priestly or scientific class any further.

CHAPTER VI

THE ORIGIN AND FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

ALL orders of religious belief have constantly been asserted to have taken origin in some indubitably authentic fashion. The priest who expounds these beliefs is himself of divine descent; or he has obtained his creed through tradition from the assertions of a divine person; or he has been directly inspired from on high; or he is the possessor and interpreter of a sacred book, the writers of which were inspired. Plainly, it is very desirable that the official exponents of any creed shall be able to assign to it an authoritative and unimpeachable origin. It is essential that its credentials shall be beyond criticism.

The early pre-scientific students of religion, such as the Christian missionaries to savage and aboriginal peoples, were, of course, struck by the multitudinous diversity of the creeds which they found in the places of their ministrations. But they were also struck by a certain tendency to resemblance between these creeds, and even by a resemblance between such creeds and their own. Now it had formerly been thought that the Deity had made a special revelation of Himself to one chosen people, the Hebrews. But when it was found that, say, the Red Indian believed in a Great Spirit, the idea became current that the Deity, in the beginning, had made a revelation of Himself in all lands. According to this notion, monotheism was the primitive divinely-revealed religion. All the other forms of religious belief

were regarded as having been derived from this primitive monotheism of revelation by processes of degradation, corruption, forgetfulness or back-sliding; but the germs of the revealed truth could still be faintly observed even in the most degraded forms of fetishism.

All this, of course, was sheer nonsense from beginning to end. It was contradicted by all the facts, and supported by none. Monotheism was not the primitive creed, whether revealed or inferred. On the contrary, it represents the last stage but one in the evolution of religious beliefs.¹ Let us now begin at the beginning, and attempt to discover the manner in which religious beliefs of any kind arose.

There are two outstanding theories, but in all probability it is not necessary to choose between them, since both contain a large measure of truth. The one theory is that religious beliefs—by which in the present chapter are meant beliefs in the existence of unseen personal powers—arose by the attribution of personality to the forces of nature: in a word, that the primitive religion is nature-worship. It is held that the savage, observing the thunder and the lightning, seeing the apparent movement of the sun, contemplating all the movements and powers of nature, was struck with awe and wonder at the marvels by which he was surrounded. His naturally reflective mind found itself compelled to ask the nature of the powers that so impressed it. Arguing by analogy from his own

¹ The last stage I conceive to be the “higher pantheism”: the recognition, with the sublime minds of all ages, of Nature as the “Living Garment of God.”

experience of his own actions, he inferred that the forces of nature must doubtless be impelled by conscious personalities like his own, and thus he came to worship not so much nature as the personal forces which he believed to be behind nature.

Now this theory has long held wide sway in the minds of the students of comparative mythology and folk-lore. That there is some measure of truth in it we can scarcely deny, but that it expresses the *most* primitive origin of religious beliefs I certainly question. For we may note that the savages we know, and the peasant—indeed the mass of the uncultured who live in close contact with the forces of nature—do not, in point of fact, display that lively interest or that subtlety of analogical reasoning, which is declared by the supporters of this theory to have generated the first beliefs in the existence of unseen intelligences in nature. On the contrary, the yokel or the savage is very much apt to take nature for granted. The primrose by the river's brim a simple primrose is to him. The sun rises and sets because “it is its nature to.” A lively and reflective interest in the origin of natural phenomena is not actually found to be characteristic of the untutored or primitive mind. Certainly the time does come when personality is attributed to the various forces of nature, but that is not until the idea that such personalities, apart from living men and women, do exist has been independently reached in another fashion.

The other theory as to the origin of religious beliefs we owe to Herbert Spencer. That is to say, we owe to him the theory which attempts to explain

their most primitive origin. Far older than he, of course, is the knowledge that primitive peoples believe in the active interference of the spirits of the departed in human affairs. The belief in such spirits in general is called animism. It is plainly not far from the belief in the existence and activity of the spirit of a departed chief, to the practice of attempting to please him, and to gain his aid in various directions. The question arises whether such a belief did not precede the belief in the existence of personal powers in nature. As Spencer observes, it is surely in the last degree unreasonable to assert that men believed in the existence of personal powers in nature before they had come to believe in the continued activity of human personality after death—that the belief in spirits of the inanimate preceded belief in the spirits of the animate.

What, then, can we imagine to have been the origin of the belief that the personalities of men continue after death actively to interfere with the fortunes of the living? This question Spencer attempted to answer by what may be called the dream-theory of the origin of religious beliefs. He argues somewhat in this fashion: The savage inclines to regard his dreams as portions of experience no less real and credible than the experience of his waking moments.¹

¹ It is of some interest to observe that quite recently Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, of Oxford, in the *Hibbert Journal* has propounded, in the interests of idealism, a doctrine which amounts to this: that there is no particular reason why we should not regard the experience of our dreams as true, save simply that we find it less useful than daily experience "for our purposes"!

From his observation of the shadows of objects and from the experience of his dreams, in which he finds himself to have been apparently transported to other places whilst his friends assert that his body remained where he fell asleep, the savage obtains the idea of a *double* or *other-self*. Spencer shows how the facts of somnambulism and swoon, apoplexy and other forms of insensibility, may be conceived as having helped to generate this idea of the other-self. Nor does the savage readily distinguish between apparent and actual death. In cases of apparent death, surely the other-self has temporarily departed, but is observed to return. May it not then be concluded that, in cases of actual death, the other-self continues to exist, but does not return? Hence, suggested Spencer, arose the belief called animism. Now if the spirits of the departed continue to exist, and to interest themselves in mundane affairs, it is well to maintain good relations with them. And especially will it be well to maintain good relations with the spirits which may be supposed to be more potent: the spirits of the great chiefs who were so powerful during their terrestrial lives. Hence the great chief, long departed, comes to be worshipped as divine. His cult may be especially carried on by his descendants, and thus arises ancestor-worship, such as we find it even in the Chinese of to-day.

After the development of the belief in the spirits of beings once animate, asserts Spencer, there would arise the belief that the forces of nature were themselves also animated by spirits. We may scarcely imagine what a fearsome thing was religion to the

early savage, thus surrounded by potent though unseen persons on whose sufferance alone he was allowed to live and prosper.

Certain places or objects would become sacred, since they were supposed to be especially favoured as resorts by the spirits of the departed. Thus the man who makes himself an idol, as described in Isaiah, of "a tree that will not rot," must not be imagined to worship it for itself, but rather to worship the spirit which, for one reason or another, he regards as having taken up its abode therein. It would seem impossible to believe, as many have believed, that even the most primitive savage will worship, for itself, the work of his own hands.

Thus we may conceive polytheism to have arisen : nor is there any difficulty in imagining that the obvious necessity for allotting different measures of power to various deities would result, in the course of time, in the assertion of the existence of a supreme deity, a God above all gods. To polytheism, then, succeeded monotheism ; and the familiar collection of ancient writings which we call the Old Testament illustrates for us not only the evolution of monotheism from polytheism, but the gradual development and ennoblement of the idea which men formed of the one God. Plainly the God of Amos and Isaiah, the God who would have mercy and not sacrifice, represents a far higher and later religious conception than the bloodthirsty monster who is depicted in many of the earlier pages of the Hebrew scriptures.

Space fails for the discussion here of the evolution of ecclesiastical institutions. Nor do I propose to

discuss the characters of such institutions, their inherent conservatism,¹ their necessary antagonism to science (as noted in the last chapter), or their relations to the governing institutions. Rather would I pass to the great question of the future of religious beliefs.

Whilst some hold that religious beliefs correspond to a "permanent need of man's nature," others declare that they arose in superstition, and must fall with the fall of superstition. These last regard religion and superstition as identical; and they regard the present and future recognition and triumph of science as necessarily involving the complete destruction of its antagonist. Readers of the earlier pages of "First Principles," however, will recognise that the identification of religion with superstition is false, and due either to bias or to the most superficial study. They will recognise that, whilst there assuredly is eternal warfare between science and superstition—a warfare that must last without quarter until the older of the combatants is killed—there is no warfare between religion and science, since religious beliefs contain an element of truth, and "if both religion and science have bases in the reality of things, then between them there must be a fundamental harmony. There cannot be two orders of truth in absolute and everlasting opposition."

It is unfortunately outside the province of this volume, and even outside that of its successor, to discuss the proposition that there is an element of truth even in those religious beliefs which seem so

¹ See Chapter XIII.

puerile to the mind trained in the contemplation of the order of nature ; but I cannot refrain—in justice to myself, since I have often tilted in these pages at many religious beliefs still current—from asserting my conviction, as against perhaps the majority of scientific thinkers of our time, that since religious beliefs have “bases in the reality of things,” there is a future for them. This must not, indeed, be held to imply that I find warrant, either in the sociological study of the origin of religious beliefs or elsewhere, for thinking that the “forms of faith” now officially fought for by “graceless zealots” will be held by any one ten thousand years hence. But holding as I do that religious beliefs, even though they originated “in a nightmare,” represent man’s perception, however imperfect, of a truth, I am bound to hold that they will survive as long as man himself.

Truth fails not ; but her outward forms that bear
The longest date do melt like frosty rime,
That in the morning whiten’d hill and plain,
And is no more ; drop like the tower sublime
Of yesterday, which royally did wear
His crown of weeds, but could not even sustain
Some casual shout that broke the silent air,
Or the unimaginable touch of Time.¹

CHAPTER VII

THE TYPES OF SOCIETY

THE title of this chapter might well be allotted—like the titles of many of my chapters—to a great

¹ Wordsworth.

treatise. It is not, however, my purpose to condense into a few pages the substance of such a treatise, but rather to discuss the contrast between the two most prominent types of society that concern us to-day as men in a world of men, and especially as students of morality. Social types may be arranged according to their complexity, just as individual organisms may be arranged; but here we are to consider a subdivision which, though secondary in any systematic discussion of the subject, is yet primary in practical importance.

This is the subdivision of more or less complex societies into two great types, the predominantly *military* and the predominantly *industrial*. Of these, the first is by far the older and by far the most honoured by the majority; but we may at once anticipate the conclusion to which we shall be forced, that the military type of society is not the highest—that it is, on the contrary, the lowest; that it is immeasurably inferior when judged by any ethical standard; and that, though it may in all probability be credited with the performance of certain useful functions, like slavery itself, in time past, yet it is now—or, if not now, soon will be—an anachronism, a thing the need of which men have outgrown, and which cannot too soon be ended.

In the militant type of society the army and the nation are practically identical. Every able-bodied male is, *ipso facto*, a soldier. “The army is the nation mobilised, while the nation is the quiescent army.” In every society there is co-operation, as in every multicellular organism; and the characteristic of the co-operation of militant societies is

that it is *compulsory*. Of the citizen as of the soldier it may be said, "Their's not to reason why," but simply to obey. The Government overrules the citizen's will in all matters, private as well as public. Plainly this state of the environment must produce a corresponding type of character in the citizen—a type of character which must differ markedly from that produced by the voluntary co-operation which is the characteristic of the more highly-evolved industrial type of society.

That the military type of society is more primitive must be apparent when we consider what it implies. Such a society is militant for purposes of defence or for purposes of aggression, or for both. But, in each case, it is necessarily less stable than the society which can afford to be non-militant. It is more subject to change, and is thus further from the goal of evolution, which is the stability that ensues upon perfect adaptation to the environment. Furthermore, a militant society must be less highly evolved, because so large a portion of its activities is squandered upon what is outside it, leaving only a relatively small share of energy for its internal needs, which must therefore be less completely satisfied. Further, the type of society which is distinguished by compulsory co-operation, by the subordination of the individual, must necessarily be lower than a society *may* be, since its methods of compulsion and regulation permit it to avail itself less of the originality and variety of its constituent citizens.

The teaching of Spencer, that there is a relation between the type of society and the type of family, needs some measure of qualification due to the

more recent researches which have shown that monogamy has, probably in all times, been more prevalent than polygamy;¹ but, nevertheless, the generalisation will hold that, on the whole, the militant type of society tends to favour polygamy, whilst the industrial type tends to favour monogamy: this, in all probability, mainly because of the relative abundance of women, which is a consequence of war. Needless to say, any measure of truth in this generalisation furnishes a conclusive condemnation, on one score at any rate, of the militant as compared with the industrial type of society; not merely because polygamy offers fewer advantages to the children than does monogamy, but because it necessarily implies a low position of woman. It may further be noted that in the militant type of society, quite apart from polygamy, the female sex is at a disadvantage, for children of that sex are reckoned as of less value to the State than those children who will become soldiers. Thus infanticide of female children is encountered, with all that it implies of moral degradation. Hence it may be argued on very many grounds that the decline of militancy and rise of industrialism is necessarily accompanied by a gradual removal of the domestic and political disabilities of women. In this connection it is curious to observe that, in a discussion of the right of women to the franchise, Spencer argues that their inability to bear arms is a disqualification. It is impossible to follow this argument, which seems to me to be refuted by Spencer himself. For if women, as he has demon-

¹ See Chapter II.

strated, suffer under militancy, it seems in the highest degree unjust to refuse to them a share in determining whether or not a nation shall fight, merely on the grounds that they do not themselves suffer in person in battle, and are not able to fight with their own hands. There would be more strength, surely, in the argument, if it were the case that war left women uninjured ; whereupon it might reasonably be argued that they should have no voice in the determination of a nation to an undertaking which injured the men but left themselves scatheless.

But whilst thus passing judgment upon the military type of society, we must not be blind to its services. There can be little doubt that co-operation in war is the chief cause of the formation of early societies, or, to use technical language, of social integration. At first, savages enter into temporary unions for offence and defence. Then many tribes may unite against a common enemy, and thus a nation may be formed.

In accordance with our principle that everything must be judged—so far as the sociologist is concerned—by its effect on individual character, we must ask ourselves what is the type of character that tends to be produced by militancy. On this most important matter we find a great discrepancy between the views of the historian and even of the poet on the one hand, and those of the scientific student on the other.

The historians have hitherto tended to the opinion that a lasting peace brings disastrous consequences upon character. They quote occasions on which it

has appeared that the succession of an industrial to a militant period has weakened the national fibre, and has thus wrought more harm than good. This is a teaching which makes obvious claims to plausibility, and it has ever been popular. That there is some measure of truth in it can scarcely be denied, though we may question whether its truth has ever undergone analysis at the hands of those who teach it. If it were indeed true that the abomination of war is a necessary condition of the virtue of mankind, we might be compelled to agree with Huxley, that the ethical process is in antagonism with the cosmic process. The doctrine as taught by the historians is perhaps as pessimistic as any that can be conceived. But the sociologist knows that it is only a half-truth, and most imperfectly expressed at that. Thus the present writer, who can never sufficiently declare the reverence and gratitude which Wordsworth inspires in him, can never read without deep regret that familiar sonnet which thus begins:—

When I have borne in memory what has tamed
Great nations, how ennobling thoughts depart
When men change swords for ledgers

for the sociologist is convinced that, though war has played a part in social integrations, and may even have been an almost indispensable factor at certain stages of social evolution, yet it is precisely “when men change swords for ledgers,” when the militant yields to the industrial type of society, that human character finds itself in the environment that is best fitted for its finest efflorescence.

The history of the word virtue, for instance, is incompatible with the doctrine upon which I have now animadverted. It clearly shows that, in militant societies, men identify "manliness," bravery, and strength with goodness—a conception which surely carries with it its own condemnation to any but the base to-day. The militant society favours revenge, and therefore identifies forgiveness with weakness, or lack of *virtus*. The higher virtues find no favour in a militant society; that the virtues admired in such societies—courage and strength—are by no means impossible or unnecessary in an industrial society surely no one will question. In every sense, "Peace hath her victories no less than war." Whilst, therefore, we assert that the highest social possibilities fundamentally depend on the cessation of militancy, so also we assert that the highest ethical possibilities so depend—the historians with their unexamined assertions as to "enervating peace," notwithstanding. The "religion of enmity" is the necessary concomitant of militant societies which, in the nature of the case, cannot profess the "religion of amity." Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that they "profess" it; but, as we have lately seen amongst ourselves, when there occurs a reversion to the militant type, the professed religion of amity can be reconciled by many of its professors with actions which would have excited the consuming scorn and condemnation of its Founder.

But I have ventured to pass judgment upon Gibbon, Macaulay, and even Wordsworth, and to declare that their condemnation of peace contains a half-truth which they have failed to analyse; and I

must attempt to justify my criticism. In so doing, it may perhaps be possible to make apparent the reasons which, as I take it, account for the wide acceptance of their teaching.

I believe the truth so grossly misexpressed by the unscientific writers is that men—at any rate up to this present—do not well when they cease to *struggle*. War is in general only one aspect of the struggle for existence; and the biologist inclines to the view that this struggle, which he finds everywhere, alike in the animal and the vegetable kingdoms, is apparently an almost necessary condition of evolution. There is thus grave danger of deterioration for the organism, whether individual or social, which is under no necessity to struggle. Peace is enervating, we will grant, if you allow us to use the word in a wider sense than yours, as meaning much more than merely the negation of military warfare. As students of biology we well know that peace, in this wide sense, almost necessarily implies degradation. No living organism has a more peaceful existence, in this sense, than an intestinal worm, which lives in safety and warmth, and so to speak, in an atmosphere of pre-digested food. It has given up the struggle for existence, or rather, it has succeeded too well, and it has paid the penalty of success in its degradation.

Therefore I would argue that it is not peace in the narrower sense, but opulent prosperity, that “has tamed great nations,” and hence that not *military* warfare but warfare *of some kind* is a necessary condition of social as of the individual advancement, lest “wealth accumulates and men decay.”

Industrial societies, which have beaten the sword into the sewing-machine, need not fear the enervation of peace *so long as they find it necessary to be industrious.* It is when they have succeeded too well, and can live upon their accumulated resources, that they are in danger of demoralisation. They are then, like the tape-worm, apt to become parasitic—upon humanity as a whole.

Thus analysing the half-truth expressed by the historians, we may conclude that, in the present state of human nature, industrial warfare is to be welcomed, just as they profess to welcome military warfare, and for the same reasons.

Certainly industrial warfare *is* warfare. It is very far indeed from representing the highest ethical ideal: but it serves the purpose of military warfare in a fashion immeasurably superior.

And there arises the final question: Is the industrial state of society, even though it be perfectly pacific, in the ordinary sense of that word, and thus vastly superior to the militant, the best that can be conceived? Or can we imagine a higher social type, as superior to the industrial as that is superior to the militant? And if we can imagine it, can we actually predict it—a state of society in which the struggle for existence now tending to be represented by industrial rather than military warfare will have ceased? And if we make such a prediction, how are we to reconcile it with the assertion that life without labour must degenerate?

When considering this matter, I was at first at a loss to reach any consistent or satisfactory conclusion. I have long taken pleasure in the con-

temptation of the future social type, predicted by Spencer, which "will use the products of industry neither for maintaining a militant organisation nor exclusively for material aggrandisement, but will devote them to the carrying on of higher activities"; but it was at first difficult to reconcile the conception of a social state where struggle of every kind, even including industrial warfare, had ceased, with the conviction that struggle is a condition of the ennoblement of life. A solution was not to be found in what Henry Drummond called the "struggle for the life of others," for it may be conceived that, in the future, that struggle also, though not wholly abolished, will have been reduced to very small proportions. But I think a reconciliation between the two conceptions may be found in the consideration that struggle of *every kind* will never, can never be abolished. Even when men cease to fight against one another, whether by machine-guns, or tariffs, or technical knowledge, there will still remain the ceaseless struggle with Nature, our stern parent, and with the limitations of our own minds. Darwin was a man of means, and no controversialist. So far as material things were concerned, he had no struggle; and he cared not to contest, even on paper, with his fellow-men. But whereas many thus "favoured by Fortune" simply "dry-rot at ease," as Browning somewhere has it, Darwin was engaged, all his life long, in an incessant contest with the difficulties of observation afforded him by Nature, and the difficulties of interpretation afforded him by the limitations of his own magnificent mind.

And even if we descend to a lower plane than that of the servant of Truth (who ever lies at the bottom of a well, and needs that men should “strive and agonise” to find her), we shall see that men will always find abundance of work that must be done. However great the material achievements of science, man, the insatiable, will ask for more. If he can travel at a hundred miles an hour he will strive to travel at two hundred; if he can reach the North Pole he will try to reach Mars.

And the artist well knows that he and his are destined to struggle till the end. Even if he can write the third act of a “Tristan and Isolde,” he must strive to write other pages which shall outshine that as Sirius a tallow candle. Whatever the social type of the future, men will never cease to fight. The difference will lie in the foe and the object of the fight.

Hence I will call the future social type the *spiritual*, as distinguished from the *militant* and the *industrial*.

In the spiritual type of society, when at length there is no other, all internecine warfare of the more obvious kinds will have ceased. Such a society will devote none of its energies to military aggression or defence; for the one it will have no desire and for the other no need. Such a society will not even devote most of its energies to industrial competition with its neighbours—competition less brutal than war, less injurious to the highest aspects of human character, but not necessarily less wasteful. Such a society, like each of its neighbours, will have its own industrial activities, its own

technical and scientific specialisms; and we can scarcely assent to the prediction of Professor Simon Newcomb, the distinguished American astronomer, that scientific discovery and technique will have reached such perfection that life will be lacking in interest. The future will have its own problems of population and food-supply; and the sun is growing cold.

But whilst industry and technology thrive, they will not be dominant in the social type which I have called spiritual. The material wants of man will be satisfied by means of the expenditure of only an insignificant fraction of the social energy. Even the higher kinds of material want, such as the means of travelling, which will enable every one to see whatever of grandeur, and of beauty, and of human interest the planet affords, will be readily satisfied. The greater part of the social energy will certainly not be expended in *regulation*, as in militant societies, or those conceived by the earlier socialism. The attitude towards life will be that of the merchants and men of business praised by Stevenson, who worked all day—"but in the evening, messieurs, we *live*." Then, as I have suggested in an essay on the "Future of Art," will be the full fruition of all the æsthetic possibilities of men. In the spiritual type of society, where material wants are easily satisfied, men will be justified in devoting large portions of their time to those activities with which most of us are now justified in filling only the leisure part of life. International competition will remain to show itself in a noble patriotism, which rejoices—to use the

illustration suggested by Carlyle—more in our Shakespeare than our India. The heroes of the future will be not the most colossal murderers—the Napoleons and the like—nor the most unscrupulous captains of industry—the Oil Kings, and others of that kidney, but—

the kings of thought,
Who waged contention with their time's decay,
And of the past are all that cannot pass away.¹

To the industrialism of the present—which is at present a legitimate means to the legitimate end of the fulness of life—there will succeed, in the spiritual type of society, a nobler industry concerned with the accumulation of riches which neither moth nor rust can corrupt, stored in the mansions of the mind, where thieves cannot break through nor steal. These will not be ungrateful to those who, in their own place and time, have laid the foundations of noble edifices of which they themselves have scarcely dreamed. To the men of science will be accorded a due measure of reverence—to the chemists and the bacteriologists and the technologists—the Pasteurs and Jenners and Bessemers. Their successors in time coming will have their due measure of respect. Above them will be ranked not, as now, the champions of Destructive and Constructive Imperialism, but those rarest and, when their time—thanks to the others—is come, those most precious heroes, the artists and the philosophers, the champions of Constructive Beauty and Constructive Thought. And in the schoolrooms

¹ Shelley's "Adonais."

of that happy age, and in its academic halls and its temples, there will perchance be engraven these words of Solomon—

Righteousness exalteth a nation,

and these of Wordsworth—

There is one great society alone on earth,
The noble living and the noble dead.

PART II

APPLIED SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER VIII

THE EDUCATION QUESTION

IN accordance with the theory of society which has already been put forward, we must necessarily maintain that its parents are the naturally appointed educators of a child. If the reader accepts my definition of education as the provision of an environment, he will admit that, in any case, the parents, in providing the environment of the home, are the most important educators, even should they never impart any item of information to their children. But the spectacle of a child's education by its father is scarcely within the domain of the sociologist at all; it is when the child is taught by some one else that sociological questions arise. Now, in general, the children of a modern civilised community are not taught by their parents: and we must inquire as to the alternatives that are adopted.

Let us confine ourselves to our own land. The children of the upper and middle classes are not taught by their parents, who, in general, are incompetent when belonging to the idle classes, and too

busy when belonging to the educated working class. Such parents, then, pay persons, who are assumed to have undergone a special training for the purpose, to teach their children. This, to the evolutionist, is simply a typical case of that "integration" and division of labour which are witnessed in the evolving entity, whether it be the individual or the social organism. If the sociologist is asked to pronounce an opinion upon this custom, as to whether it is desirable or not, he concerns himself—in accordance with the principles laid down in the first chapter—with its results upon the character of the children and the parents. He is inclined, sometimes, to be rather dubious as to the complete propriety of the arrangement; but on the whole he has not much criticism to make, save of the boarding-school system, the wisdom of which he cannot reconcile with his theory of the importance of the family and the home.

But when we come to consider the lower classes, we find ourselves faced with an entirely different problem. Their children are involved in a system of "national education." The essence of this system is that, in greater or less degree—the steady tendency being towards its increase—the cost of education is borne by others than the parents of the children. Established thirty-five years ago, with practically only one dissentient voice (that of Herbert Spencer), our system of national education has steadily tended towards the establishment of the principle that the bachelor, the spinster, and the man whose own children are being educated at his own expense, shall pay for the education of the children of the

so-called "working man." This system may be interpreted in three ways. It might be that the upper and middle classes pay simply as a form of charity to people in less fortunate circumstances: a charity for which the said people should be as grateful as if it were effected by the actual sending of money to the parents, in order to pay for their children's education. Or the system may be interpreted as in no sense charitable, but purely selfish: the children are "assets of the State," and it "pays" the citizens to look after them; in later years they will fight for him and work for him all the better, if he expends a little money upon their education now. Or this system may be looked upon as charity to the children—it being assumed that, without it, they would receive no education at all.

However, the sociologist who accepts the teaching that, in the last resort, the only substantial criterion of any social system is its effect upon character, will concern himself not with the possible interpretations of our modern system of national education, but with its consequences, as seen in the parents and their children. In the first place he notes that, if the system is really an organised philanthropy, it is philanthropy of the worst kind; for he holds that the charity which blesses him that gives and him that takes is the only kind worth having, and he is absolutely certain that the essential condition of such charity is that it be *personal*—that the giver be a "cheerful giver," that he that takes shall meet, face to face, "him that gives," or shall at any rate be fully aware that the gift is really expressive of a sympathy for him that is felt in the heart of the

giver. The kind of philanthropy that is effected by the grudging, grumbling payment of taxes, on penalty of a summons, does not count for much as an elevator of human nature.

Then the sociologist inquires as to the influence upon the child of this system of free education. He finds that such influence as can be traced in the child is a mere expression of the influence of the system upon the parent, and to this he finds it necessary to devote much attention.

It might be said, *à priori*, and was said by Herbert Spencer, the unwearied opponent of our present system of national education, that the sense of parental responsibility was bound to be adversely affected if parental duties and privileges were abrogated. And the question for us to answer, after thirty-five years, is whether *experience* accords with the *à priori* prophecy of evil.

Probably, on the whole, it does so accord; and if it does, if the system makes the parent of less worth to his children than he would otherwise have been, then, since it injures those whom it is designed to serve, it is condemned: condemned on counts probably more important than that which observes that the system entails the compulsory abstraction from the middle-class working man of part of his legitimate earnings in order to pay for the education of the children of other parents, and may even entail an injury to his children, so that the children of others may benefit.

That this system is indeed injuring the children by injuring the *moral* of their parents, it seems almost impossible to doubt. The cry is now for

"free breakfasts." Certainly no one who declares that a child should be educated by the State—*i.e.* by people who have never seen it, and who have children of their own to educate—can possibly dispute the proposition that it should also be fed by the State; there is no difference in principle. My distinguished friend, Mr. Jonathan Hutchinson, who advocates the "nationalisation of the child," frankly declares that every child should be fed by the State (*i.e.* by the parents of other children) as a matter of course. This is, indeed, an amazing doctrine to most of us; yet it is impossible to detect in it any principle not already fully conceded by the advocates of free education.

It is said that 60,000 underfed children go every morning to the national schools of London. If this statement be even approximately true, or if it be correlated with the known facts as to the national drink bill—which exclude the supposition that these children are starving because their parents have not the wherewithal to feed them—we cannot question that there is, from whatever cause, a terrible deficiency in the parental sense. As to the measure in which this deficiency may be attributed to our educational system, I will not dogmatise; but will merely reiterate the conviction that the first duty of every intelligent person who is called upon to decide as to the merits of any educational reform is to ask himself—How will this affect the character of the children and of their parents?

Such, then, very briefly and imperfectly stated, is the education question as it is conceived by the

sociologist. He stands aloof from all the attempts of this or that sect to make the adherents of another pay for the religious teaching of the children of its own adherents ; nor to him does the education question resolve itself into a matter of the number of clauses that shall form the official creed of any school. His interest is with the education question so far as it affects the character of the units that compose or will compose the society which he studies.

But this being his interest, the sociologist cannot fail to concern himself with another educational question of the first magnitude—the teaching of the principles of morality in our schools. He brushes aside, as mere impertinence, the pretensions of those sectaries who declare that the proposal to secularise education is a proposal to deny the teaching of morals to our children. He recognises that the practice and example of the home are infinitely more important than the precept of the school; but he is absolutely certain that, if it is worth while to have any system of national education at all, it is worth while to use that system as a means of inculcating the truths of morality.

CHAPTER IX

SOCIETY AND CRIME

In the volume on ethics it will be necessary for us to consider the essential nature of crime, and to express the concept involved in biological language

But here we must imperatively devote at least one chapter to a very brief consideration of that young branch of sociology which concerns itself specially with the study of crime, and is called criminology. Of this most necessary science the great Italian student Lombroso is the founder, and its most distinguished students are his pupils. Primarily Lombroso is an anthropologist, a student of the physical and mental characters of different types or races of men. Thus criminology may be conceived as none other than criminal anthropology—the study of the anthropology of criminals. In so far as it confines itself strictly to the study of physical characters, criminal anthropology is not strictly a branch of sociology; but its conclusions are of immense importance to the sociologist. Of still greater importance to him is the study of the psychical characters of criminals. For the sociologist, the student of man as a social animal, is by implication a psychologist—a student of man the individual.

The Italian school of criminology has not infrequently been guilty of the excesses of youth, and some of its doctrines have earned perhaps not undue derision. Nevertheless it certainly does appear to have established two or three extremely important facts which greatly concern the sociologist, for these facts serve to teach him how crime is generated and the manner in which much of it may be prevented. The full appreciation of their significance would completely revolutionise that important branch of applied sociology which is called penology—the science of punishment.

The chief conclusion reached by Lombroso and his followers is that there exists, probably in all societies, a special criminal type. This type is marked by a number of easily recognisable physical characters, mainly of the face and the skull. These characters very frequently resemble those commonly met with in the insane. Indeed, very many criminals, according to Lombroso, belong to the class of what he calls mattoids — that is to say, persons who are somewhere within the intermediate region between the certainly sane and the certainly insane. Now it is the most important fact concerning these born criminals that they *are* born criminals. Their characters are essentially congenital — not acquired but germinal. And in accordance with the well-recognised laws of heredity, these germinal or inborn characters are liable to be, and constantly are, transmitted by the born criminal to his descendants. If there is anything certain, it plainly is that such a criminal should not be allowed to have any descendants. From the more general point of view, the born criminal is an example of reversion. He is of lower type than the average man of to-day. He is nearer the lower animals. That this is so, his physical characters abundantly demonstrate; so also do his moral characters. That this should be so, will be readily tenable to the reader of the volume on ethics, wherein he will, I hope, be convinced that the essential character of crime is simply a reversion to that greater preponderance of egoism over altruism which distinguishes the lower animals from man.

Now to this important discovery of the criminolo-

gists there is an equally important correlative. The weakness of the school of Lombroso lies precisely in their relatively undue insistence upon the facts of inborn criminality, and their neglect of the facts of *acquired* criminality. We should go far wrong indeed were we to imagine that the existence of crime is to be explained merely by the assertion that throughout various strata of society there are disseminated a certain number of less-highly evolved individuals—individuals of a lower race—whose nature is criminal, that is to say, anti-social. No; society need not fancy that its responsibility for crime is thus easily to be disposed of. It will not do to say, “Until recently we were unaware of the existence of this degenerate race in our midst, and now that we are aware, surely we cannot be blamed for the facts of heredity which are beyond human control.” It will not even do to say that now that we are aware of this breed it is our business to exterminate it as decently as may be, and that thereafter crime and our responsibility for it will have ceased.

It will not do for this reason; that however freely we may grant the existence amongst us of a special race of the inevitably criminal, there still remains a vast measure of crime which is susceptible of no such explanation. At bottom, you may be sure, every man-Jack of us is a born criminal. These others are bound more firmly—it may well be—in the chains of fate; so firmly that for them there can scarcely be any redemption. But we also, every one of us, have the strain of egoism which may well assert itself as crime—that is to say, as the desire to achieve individual happiness of sorts at the expense

of the happiness of others. Therefore, whilst fully realising the importance of Lombroso's discovery, we must clearly remember, and continue to remember, that, since heredity has provided each of us in varying measure with the potentiality for crime, the environment may nourish and develop these potentialities, and so produce crime which, given another environment, might not have been witnessed. Indeed, even when the theory of the born criminal is given its full measure of importance, we may safely assert that the greater part of criminality is not in-born, but acquired—that is to say, developed under the influence of environment.

But, ere we consider the conditions of the social environment which now foster crime, we may accord to the conception of Lombroso a due appreciation of a very great service which it has rendered to criminology—the service of teaching men that crime, like all other phenomena, is subject to the law of causation. Those who are duly impressed by Lombroso's discovery will no longer regard crime as the symptom of a moral turpitude for which the criminal is to be held responsible. They will agree that penology cannot act as if it were its business to visit the criminal with condign punishment on the ground that he could do better "if he liked." They will recognise that his crime is a product of innate conditions for which he cannot be held responsible, and that punishment must no longer be regarded as essentially *vindictive*, but as curative or preventive. We must leave the notion of vindictive punishment to be exploited by the theologians alone. Those who have come thus far will be fit to consider the further

doctrine that even such crime as cannot be referred to heredity may yet be referred to environment—environment for which the manufactured criminal is no more responsible than is the born criminal for his hereditary taint.

Thus when the student of sociology reads the account of any crime he regards it from the stand-point of the scientific psychologist who recognises that the human will, that human character expressing itself in acts of will, is not arbitrary or "free" or uncaused, but is the joint-product of heredity and environment. In the great majority of cases, where the criminal does not answer to Lombroso's description of the criminal type, the student turns him then to the consideration of the environmental conditions which have produced the crime. For instance, he declares that, human integrity having its limits, it is the duty of society not to lead the individual into temptation. He declares that much crime, such as embezzlement, is due to the provision of such an environment of temptation as only the very few can withstand. That it is a duty not to lead others into temptation is recognised by the individual when he is careful not to leave petty cash on his dressing-table, and by society when it regulates the number of hours during which an employer may exact day-labour from a child. But this duty of minimising temptation has yet to be completely discharged by society.

It is evidently unnecessary for me to detail the various ways in which society should discharge its duty of preventing the acquirement of criminal habits, in addition to its plain duty of interfering

with the multiplication of the born criminal. It is unnecessary here to discuss the question as to whether there is a causal relation between the introduction of universal education in this country, and the observed diminution in crime since that event. Nor can I here refer to the monstrous generation of crime by that factor of the environment which we call alcohol. But this brief chapter cannot be concluded without a reference to one form of environment which society now provides for certain of its members, and those the most likely to be injured by it.

Prison chaplains, judges, scientific students of crime, the police-court missionaries, and all who have any practical acquaintance with the subject, are agreed that our present penal system is radically wrong. Indeed, what is the history of our present ideas regarding punishment? They are all derived from pre-scientific times, when the bare notion that there might be such a thing as penology—a science of punishment—was utterly unknown. They are derived from times when people believed in original sin, when the very conception first clearly expressed by Lamarck in the term “milieu environnant,” had never entered, as an explicit factor, into human thinking. It sufficed that imprisonment rid society for a time of the activities of the criminal, and that, as was thought, the menace of it, or the memory of it, would prove to be a deterrent from crime. But of late penology has made a scientific study of our prison system and its consequences—fixing its attention upon the character of the criminal, and it has been clearly shown that our prison system pro-

vides the very worst possible environment for the youth who has within him, like all of us, criminal potentialities which it remains for the environment to develop or suppress. Our prisons are nurseries of crime, forcing-houses for criminals. If this be so they are utterly condemned.

Again, the sociologist finds it necessary to make comparative studies of the different kinds of environment which are apt to produce the manufactured as distinguished from the born criminal; and, in round terms, it may be said that his inquiries result in the condemnation of cities as compared with the country. Again, the sociologist distinguishes, or attempts to distinguish, between that type of crime which depends upon the bestial preponderance of egoism over altruism in the character of the criminal, and that kind of crime which is due less to any inordinate selfishness than to the appalling pressure nowadays exercised by the struggle for existence, and he perceives that this pressure is greatest in the cities. On all these and many more matters the sociologist charitably reflects, well recognising that it is for him not to condemn but to explain. One other point. The sociologist distinguishes, in his consideration of crime, between the *malum in se* and the *malum prohibitum*. He recognises quite clearly that there is a fundamental distinction between the two types of crime, and he looks with very different feelings upon the man who has committed an act which is essentially anti-social, and the man who has committed a factitious offence against the laws of the land. The sociologist recognises that any system of legal enactments is

no more than an evolving social institution, and he knows too much of the history of society, and the intellectual causes of its progress,¹ to condemn a man merely for disobedience as such. Obedience and disobedience are neither right nor wrong as such. Either may be saintly or foul.

CHAPTER X

AN INDICTMENT OF THE MODERN CITY²

GIVEN sufficiently bad logic and a sufficiently ingenuous and uncritical observer, there is no lie that cannot be bolstered up by statistics: though this is not to say that almost all problems are not finally solved, if at all, by the scientific use of the statistical method. Now the death-rate is perhaps as familiar as any statistic, and the public which quotes it is not prone to worry about the difference between what the expert calls the "crude" and the "corrected death-rate. But even when the usual corrections are made, we find that the death-rates of large cities compare very favourably with those of rural districts and small towns. The Londoner may thus frequently be heard quoting the low Metropolitan death-rate in support of the contention that London is "one of the healthiest places in the world": which I here propose most strenuously to deny.

My space may be better occupied than in discussing at length the numerous facts which explain

¹ See Chap. XIII.

² Partly reprinted from the *World's Work* for April 1905, by kind permission of the Editor.

the low death-rates of large cities, and utterly invalidate the apparently obvious conclusions therefrom. Amongst such facts are the superior sanitation of the city—an accidental advantage which it will soon cease to possess; the constant influx into our cities of the most energetic and vigorous (*i.e.* the least likely to die) from the country districts; the constant exodus of the invalid and the moribund; the superior medical provision; the relatively small number of the infantile and aged, who make the major contribution to the death-rate. Let it suffice that he who would infer the healthiness of cities from their low death-rates (*relatively* low, for they are, of course, at least twice as high as they should be) is totally unacquainted with the most elementary principles of statistical criticism, and should confine himself to, let us say, the discussion of athletic records.

The first and gravest count of my indictment is that the city is the maker of poverty. This is not to say that there are no poor people in the country, but it is to assert that the veritable poverty, that body- and soul-destroying force which "makes a goblin of the sun," is essentially a product of city life as we understand it. Now a poor man is, as a rule, a *poor man*: physically—and therefore, on the average, mentally—a poor specimen of humanity. And it is the city that maims, dwarfs, and distorts him. This count of the indictment, then, merely summarises the effects wrought by certain facts of city life which come under the biological or medical accusations now to be considered.

City life, not necessarily and in the future, but avoidably and in the present, implies overcrowding.

Now it is an error to imagine that overcrowding is an evil as such. It would be a curious anomaly if man, who is *par excellence* the social animal, must necessarily suffer by reason of contiguity with his fellow man. My neighbour and I ought to be the better for one another's company, but that, in contemporary civic conditions, it implies the breathing of vitiated air by both of us. We note that the city, as at present understood and observed, is an enemy of that prime respiratory requirement which man shares with the ox and the oak and every living thing. Yet a city of pure air is not only conceivable, but is now being built not many miles from that Minotaur—demanding a tribute of more innocent lives every hour than did his ancient prototype in a year—which we call London. Tuberculosis is the most deadly of all diseases: *and its incidence varies directly with density of population.* If the apologist for our cities wants a statistical fact worth pondering over, there is one for him.

Again, the citizen is a stranger to pure air, not merely because there is so many of him, but because he burns coal, and burns it uneconomically, dirtily, and dangerously. His air is not merely an impure mixture of gases, but is loaded with deleterious solid particles as well. The lungs of the Eskimo are a pearly white; of the average Briton, a dirty grey; of the Londoner, coal-black—which is indeed to be expected, since they are full of coal.

The filthy fashion in which we citizens keep ourselves warm, burning our coal in open grates, obscuring the sun with the consequent fogs, and then groping about with torches through our self-made

plague of a darkness which may be felt and smelt and tasted—furnishes another count of my indictment: that the modern city is an insult to the sun, which is the proximate giver of life, and the great antiseptic. Sixty per cent. is the proportion of sunlight cut off from the citizens of London by the dirt in their atmosphere.

But if the modern city is to be condemned on the score of air, and on the score of light, so also it is not without condemnation on the score of food. A city should be, and the future city will be, not a whole in itself, but indivisible from a circumjacent food-producing area. The two should form one whole; and the size of the city should be naturally limited by this consideration. But at present no rational methods prevail in the food-supply of the city; and indeed they hardly can prevail whilst cities are irregularly distributed without relation to the food factor. In London, to take an extreme case, the adequate supply of good food is impracticable; and the local authorities are not even able to control such incalculably important factors in the well-being of a city as the supply of milk. The consequence is that, as has been proved, milk which has been condemned in Manchester as unfit for human consumption may be sent to London and sold there. Many times a day does the East End doctor see cases which demand, before all other things, a liberal supply of pure milk. But what orders is he to give? Pure milk is not to be had. It needs little consideration to see that, in the matters of freshness and quality of food, the modern city is much to be pitied.

The city, then, the maker of poverty, is to be condemned as largely producing its poor by means of, and then continuing to provide them with, impure air, deficiency of sunlight, and stale and often dangerous food. Against these may fairly be noted the excellent water supply of the average modern city.

Who, then, will be surprised to observe that the evidence for the physical deterioration¹ of which so much is now rightly being heard is derived from the urban districts almost alone? Here is statistical evidence not subject to the many fallacies that attend the popular interpretation of the cities' death-rate. It is the growing child of the slum that is deteriorate: not because there is anything inherently the matter with this people, but because whole and worthy human beings cannot be reared in conditions to which none of us would submit a valuable dog or pigeon or flower-bed. Reform the cities, and the last will have been heard of physical deterioration. Of course, I admit the validity of the expert evidence that it is, proximately, the feeding of the city child that is defective; but why should not the feeding of the country child be equally defective, if there be not something in the fact of city life which affects not only the child's body directly, but also the parent's mind, and thus his treatment of his child, as regards food especially?

And here is a last argument for those who put their faith in London's death-rate. How comes it that such diligent students as Dr. James Cantlie and Dr. Harry Campbell are unable to find, between

¹ See the chapter on this subject in the volume "Heredity."

them, more than half-a-dozen specimens of the *Londoner* in all London—such being defined as one all four of whose grandparents were born in London? But for the constant access of fresh blood from without, London would be depopulated in three generations. Is it, then, with anything but alarm that the serious student contemplates the fact, never too frequently to be remarked, that 77 per cent. of the population of these islands now live in cities, as compared with 51 per cent. half a century ago? Observe that these figures speak not of a mere inevitable growth of population, but of an extreme and progressive change in the *distribution* of the people. Be assured there are bigger and more vital questions of redistribution than Mr. Balfour is discussing.

But these medical considerations, and the biological evidence as to the fertility or infertility of city dwellers, must be supplemented by others, relatively subtle, but equally important. Let us proceed from physiology to psychology: from the body of the citizen to his mind.

We have seen that existence is more difficult to achieve in the city than out of it; and it follows that the “struggle for existence” must be keener. From this, again, as any sociologist knows, it follows that crime, which is mostly an expression of the unrestrained struggle for existence, will be fostered. Nearly all the “diseases of Society” are the diseases of cities. From crime we may distinguish what we call “vice.” No one needs telling how largely this is one of the foul spawn of the modern city. And in this connection one may note a grave moral

danger of overcrowding not to be forgotten when we discuss the physical danger of impure air. In only too many of its poorer quarters, the modern city is the foe of common decency.

I have referred to the physique of the citizen, and to his morals. What of his art, his relation to Nature, his love of beauty? Here, again, the city is condemned. Music may flourish in the modern city; and the drama; and a mean substitute for literature; but all the arts of a large city tend to debasement. For music we get musical comedy; for drama, such a work as Mr. Pinero's dancing doll play. Athens produced incomparable works of art, in drama and architecture and sculpture; but her population was not five millions, but *thirty thousand*—just the number about to be provided for in First Garden City!

But be assured that, whatever the popular verdict, our cities of to-day have been condemned by the only judges worth considering—the few who manufacture and circulate ideas, as others do boots or brandy. The magnificent and assuredly classic labours of the Right Hon. Charles Booth are being emulated by students of lesser cities, so that soon no self-respecting city will remain unstudied after the fashion of his study of London. Professor Patrick Geddes has had the opportunity, surely unique, of studying a small city—Dunfermline—with a view to spending half a million of money in its amelioration. Mr. Carnegie's beneficence to his native city promises to benefit many another: for when Dunfermline is remodelled, and has been visited by the enterprising inhabitants of less for-

tunate cities, a general renascence will be insisted upon. By that time we may hope that Mr. Cadbury's model village, Bournville, and Mr. Lever's Port Sunlight, will have had to yield precedence to First Garden City at Hitchin, where smoke is not to pollute the air, no slums will be found, every house will have its garden, none will cut off light from another, food will be fresh, streets and buildings will be deliberately planned with reference to beauty of composition and of detail; and, in short, there will be seen a city hardly to be identified as such, so profoundly will it differ from the cities with which we are familiar. Then, when to the advantages of cities, such as good drainage, are superadded the enormous hygienic advantages of the country, we may expect a death-rate not of 18 per 1000 per annum, but half that number.

Then what is to be done with the cities already extant? They were not built in a day; and it will take many decades to renovate them; but there is no reason why the process should not begin tomorrow. Only there must first be developed amongst us what Dr. Clouston calls a "public health conscience." Meanwhile the present conditions will be reproduced. Between the writing and reading of these words many grates will have been put into many new houses all round the growing edge of London. Each of these grates will have been constructed to contribute its *quantum* to next year's "London particulars." Yet sane grates exist. All I would indicate is that elementary hygienic considerations make certain demands, easily formulated and complied with, which might be met from

henceforth; thus proceeding with the renovation of London, yet observing strict economy. Of course, the economic question is the great difficulty. People wrongly fancy—despite “compulsory Greek”—that economy is a matter of money. But it really means the “law of the house”; and the true civic economy will concern itself with the laws which should govern the making of cities, as well as with the entirely subsidiary question of financing the city when made.

I indict the modern city, then, on the score of physiology, psychology, and art. If the charges be found proven, we must inquire as to the possibility of sentence. But I have assigned reasons to show that our evils are by no means without remedy. In point of fact, the “Utopian dream” and “Quixotic enterprise” of the typical stick-in-the-mud or conservative of one generation is invariably destined to become the commonplace of the next; and the Garden City is passing through these stages in much less than the average time; whilst the energy and wisdom of a few promise shortly to provide even London with a garden suburb at Hampstead. Fortunately, we shall none of us suffer the humiliation of hearing the abominable conditions in which we live described with due pity and disgust by our successors of a century or two hence.

In the foregoing I have attempted to introduce to the reader that very recent development of sociology which consists in the systematic study of cities, and which is now called civics. Its importance to the practical sociologist cannot be

over-estimated, since cities are yearly forming an important part of the social environment of larger numbers than ever before in history. I recommend civics, then, to the reader as a leading branch of applied sociology. The most brilliant constructive mind yet devoted to this subject is that of Professor Patrick Geddes.¹ This student, who approaches civics from the standpoint of biology—he is joint-author of the well-known “Evolution of Sex”—begins by insisting on the importance of making systematic geographical surveys of our great cities. To this he would add an historical survey of each city; and after everything has been learnt concerning the material framework of the city, and concerning its history, he would have us pass on to study the development of the citizen. This is a much deeper psychological problem. We must learn the results of the urban as contrasted with the rural environment upon the mind of the child: we must discover in how far the former is inferior to the latter, and we must endeavour to remedy its defects.

In closing this chapter I would refer the reader to a little book entitled “To-morrow,” and written by Mr. Ebenezer Howard, the founder of the Garden City Association. I believe that this remarkable book will in future days be looked upon as epoch-making. In it Mr. Howard has stated and developed his ideal of a Garden City which is finishing its first concrete realisation near Hitchin. It is to some such type as this—though with any measure of individual variation—that the cities of the future will conform.

¹ “See the important section ‘Civics,’ in ‘Sociological Papers.’”

CHAPTER XI

SOCIALISM

I PROPOSE only to write a very brief chapter on socialism in general, and I do not propose to enter into the nice distinctions which may be stated, though they are very rarely maintained, between Socialism, Communism, and Collectivism. Nor do I propose to discuss the origin of the term socialism, or the history of socialism, as a political force in Germany or elsewhere. For such matters the reader will do well to consult the article "Socialism" in the tenth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Here I would attempt rather to define the essential character of socialism, and thereafter to criticise it from the point of view of biological theory. Whereas the philosophical doctrine of anarchism—which implies not the indiscriminate use of dynamite, but the assertion that governing or regulative institutions are pernicious and unnecessary—and the not remotely allied doctrine of individualism, teach that it is well to avoid, in so far as may be, any interference with private enterprise and competition in the making of wealth, socialism teaches that it is necessary to aim at a more equal distribution of wealth by means of such regulations as will "convert into a general benefit what is now the private gain of one or a few." Of course many who repudiate the methods of the socialist fully agree with him in recognising the desirability of this end. The essential contention of the socialist is that this end is to be secured by

the employment of the compulsory powers of the central authority. He holds not that all wealth should be held in common, but rather that the means of producing wealth, the workshops, and the land, shall be held in common—that is, by the State.

No sensitive person who contemplates the facts of poverty, and contrasts the scene inside the Opera-house at Covent Garden, say, with the scenes that are enacted in the slums within a hundred yards of it, can fail to sympathise with the aims of the socialist. The question is really whether the means which he proposes to employ are the means best calculated to serve the end which he desires. And on the whole we must hold that the principles advocated by, at any rate, the earlier socialism, are *not* supported by certain scientific considerations. Of course socialism implies a certain economic theory, so that present-day socialism is often referred to as economic socialism, but I do not propose to criticise the doctrines of socialism from the point of view of the economist, but rather from the point of view of the believer in the existence and importance of that process which Darwin called natural selection.

According to modern biology, natural selection has been the means, apparently brutal, but in reality beneficent, by which the process of adaptation, which necessarily results in increased happiness, has been continued throughout all species of animal and vegetable life. The principle of natural selection is simply this: “Unto him that hath shall be given, and from him that hath not, shall be taken even that which he hath.” In virtue of natural

selection, "nothing succeeds like success," and in virtue of natural selection and the fact of heredity the success of the individual is apt to be repeated in the history of his descendants, whilst those who fail are prone to leave few descendants or none to repeat their failure. Hence natural selection or the survival of the fittest constantly makes for the increase of fitness and therefore for the happiness which, as every one surely knows in his own experience, is the necessary accompaniment of fitness in any sphere.

From the special human point of view, then, natural selection is a principle to be welcomed and encouraged and amplified. But, also from this point of view, natural selection is not perfect, for though it makes for happiness, it does so, however efficiently, in a somewhat brutal fashion. It does some evil that much good may come. Now it is, as I conceive it, possible for man to preserve and even to facilitate the beneficent action of natural selection, which has made him what he is, and yet to put a period to the painful accompaniments of the process.¹ This is to be achieved, I think, by the rigid enforcement of Nature's prohibition to the unfit, "thou shalt not propagate," but by the abrogation of her further prohibition, "thou shalt not even live." It is possible, thus, to retain the continuance of all the benefits of natural selection, and yet to fulfil the supreme law of love. Now if this attempt of mine to reconcile the apparently incompatible claims of morality and natural law be regarded as valid, we may use it as a criterion

¹ See the chapter "Natural Selection and Morality," in the volume "Ethics."

of any social theory, such as socialism. For we hold that any theory or principle which involves the abrogation of the law of natural selection must be utterly disastrous, and must therefore be incontinently condemned. On the other hand, we hold that any theory which involves the rejection of the law of love and the glorification of natural selection in its most brutal form—"every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost"—is deserving of even more summary condemnation. The only theory which we can fully commend is one which will reconcile, in the manner I have outlined, the rival claims of natural selection and the law of love.

Thus provided with the standard of judgment, what shall we say of socialism? To the earlier socialism we need scarcely refer. "In the first instance, men became socialists not from logic, but from observation of suffering and from sympathy with the sufferers." But men have come to see that good intentions alone will not justify the socialistic theory. Hence the earlier socialism has been abandoned, and nowadays writers who defend the theory consistently seek to correlate it with the facts of organic evolution, and notably with the Darwinian theory of natural selection. This newer socialism, expressed in the term Social Democracy, now claims that the theory of evolution is in its favour: whilst Herbert Spencer himself taught that the theory leads, not to socialism, but to a very complete degree of individualism. According to him, the State should be concerned with the administration of justice and with abso-

lutely nothing more. I do not propose to essay any support here of what I regard as an extreme view. But the great point to remember is this, that every theory of Social Democracy must be judged in accordance with its conformity or non-conformity to the facts of biology. It will not do to look merely to immediate consequences, as does the old lady who gives a sixpence to a tramp. As sociologists, we must ever keep our eyes open to the remote consequences of our actions.

Thus, whilst I am far from denying—Spencerian though I be—that it is impossible to frame any theory of socialism that is compatible with the teaching of biology, yet I am prepared to condemn, out of hand, every such theory that is incompatible with this teaching. The important matter, not too often to be insisted upon, is that we are possessed of an infallible criterion by which all such theories may be, and must be, judged.

For instance, any form of socialist theory or practice which involves the placing of a handicap upon natural superiority, must be summarily condemned. It is thought that the best way in which to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest number is to utilise the superior ability or greater energy of one man in order to compensate for the inferiority of another. Certainly the *immediate* result will be an advantage to the inferior. But natural selection, which always does make for greater fitness and therefore greater happiness, absolutely repudiates this method. A certain form of socialistic practice demands that the more rapid workman shall slacken his pace, lest his tardy fellows be

placed at a disadvantage. Such practice, seemingly beneficent, must be condemned by the sociologist as ultimately disastrous. The superior must benefit, in due measure, by their superiority ; and the inferior must suffer. It is by the observance of this principle that organic evolution has chiefly worked ; and it surely needs no argument to show that this must have been so.

I hold, then, that the only socialist theory which can be countenanced by the sociologist is one which achieves the compromise I have suggested between the law of sympathy and the law of natural selection. Let socialism interfere with the stern decree of natural selection to the inferior, “Thou shalt not even live.” This decree is necessary, in the natural state of things, because life implies reproduction—reproduction of inferiority. What natural selection really demands, so to speak, is not the immediate destruction of the inferior, but merely the assurance that he will not propagate his inferiority. It is the business of socialism, then, to accede to this ultimate demand of natural selection, but to do so without the employment of the summary and cruel method which, in the natural state, is necessary.

Certainly I admit that even the individual survival of the unfit, without prospect that their unfitness is to be perpetuated, entails a handicap upon the fit. Nature will not tolerate even this handicap. But when natural selection is tempered by the law of sympathy we find that such a handicap is easily borne. Every one who subscribes to a hospital or a workhouse or a pauper asylum is handicapped by the individual survival of the aged, the insane,

the diseased. Certainly it would be cheaper to poison them forthwith; and if we were compelled to do so, as natural selection, before the intervention of human intelligence, was compelled, that would be the higher charity. But we are not compelled to do so, and the small price we pay in extending our sympathy to the unfit affords us moral advantages which are infinitely above all price.

CHAPTER XII

DEMOCRACY AND ITS FUTURE

THE subject of the last chapter naturally leads us on to another of at least equal importance.

Time was when the pre-scientific students of society, who did not fully realise the dependence of sociology upon psychology, declared that the evils under which men groaned were essentially due to their government by a single autocratic individual or by an oligarchy; and that the millennium would have come when men achieved "government of the people, by the people, and for the people." Owing to causes upon which I need not dwell, this principle of democracy was at length established in many parts of the world. All the leading nations of the world are essentially democratic, and are becoming more so. I do not except Russia, since I do not know in what sense it can now be called a leading nation.

But after a considerable experience of democracy, many modern students, such as Mr. J. A. Hobson,

the author of the recently published "Democracy and Reaction," and his reviewer, Mr. John Morley, have come to the conclusion that the dawn of democracy was *not* the dawn of the millennium, that many democracies seem to be no wiser or happier than their predecessors, and even that democracy may make for reaction, as in a recrudescence of that militarism which sociologists generally associate with autocracy. In our own recent history, the Boer war is quoted as a proof that a democracy may be as brutal and as militant as any autocracy.

Thus some critics are even found who declare that men did far better under wise autocrats in times past than they do now under their own rule; and it is hinted that Carlyle was right after all in his constant assertion that government should not be "of the people by the people," but of the foolish many by the wise few.

It therefore behoves those who believe, as I do, in the rightness of the principle of democracy, to say something in defence of their beliefs against its critics.

And the first point on which I would insist is in consonance with the principle already laid down, that the sociologist is centrally concerned with human nature, which he regards as the essential factor in all social failures and all social successes. It seems to me that the present criticism of democracy gains much of its force from the circumstance that its early advocates forgot this cardinal principle of the sociologist. They thought that methods and regulations and legal enactments count for everything. They forgot Pope's line, "For forms of government

let fools contest." They fancied that another form of government was precisely the thing worth contesting for. But the present critics of democracy—I do not refer to the two distinguished thinkers whom I have named—fall into precisely the same error. Forgetting that, in the last resort, it is always and only human nature that counts, they condemn democracy for failing to achieve that which its early advocates mistakenly thought that it would achieve.

For, if we come to consider the matter closely, surely we find that the so-called faults of democracy are not really its faults at all, but *the faults of human nature*. Whether under anarchy, autocratic, aristocratic, or democratic rule, human nature is much the same. Slowly and certainly it alters in accordance with the facts of heredity, variation, and environment, but a few decades of democratic rule will not materially alter the characters of a people. Since they have failed to do so, democracy is stigmatised as a failure. But, indeed, it was absurd to imagine that they would. Probably this was not imagined. Rather did the early advocates of democracy completely *forget* that only human nature counts, and that forms of government are of importance only in so far as they affect human nature. Thus, in criticising democracy, men really criticise human nature, which is unfortunately only too open to criticism. But let the critics suggest another form of government—any one they please—it matters not. We may then proceed to criticise it for its failure to bring about the millennium; but our criticism would really amount to this, that only

Who does the public school come in?

a new kind of human nature will bring about the millennium, and that—though human nature is not “the same in all ages,” as was asserted in pre-evolutionary times—the form of government in question has failed to bring about the necessary change. Believing, as I do, that heredity is a more fundamental factor in human evolution than is environment, and that the characters—say of peacefulness—which might be acquired under a given form of government are unfortunately not transmitted by heredity, I hold that the only way in which to ennable human nature is not by the institution of any environment, such as that of democracy, but by the practice of what Mr. Galton calls eugenics.¹ Even after the practice of eugenics, says Mr. Galton, there would still be demagogues “to play to the gallery,” but they would play to a more intelligent and moral gallery than at present. The trouble with democracy at present is precisely that the gallery is of such a low order: it is not in the power of any form of government, democratic or other, to elevate the gallery. That can be achieved by eugenics alone.

As to the future of democracy, one point may be considered, since it depends upon biology, and bears directly upon the discussions of the previous chapter. It is the opinion of Mr. Morley, and of many other students, that democracy is suffering, morally, from an excess of belief, so to speak, in the Darwinian theory of natural selection, and the inevitableness of progress thereby. Mr. Morley holds that this

¹ See “The Future Evolution of Man” in the volume “Organic Evolution.”

doctrine has taken too firm a hold of the great transatlantic democracy, and that this explains the prominence of certain of the more unpleasant features which have caused many to declare that democracy is a failure.

The truth is that, whether or not this doctrine has really affected modern society in the way that is suggested, it may certainly have done so, since it had been so frequently presented for popular consumption in a wholly false form.

In a chapter of the succeeding volume we must again revert to this most important question, and see in how far the doctrine of natural selection is indicated by Nature as the rule for social action, and especially in how far the German genius and madman, Friedrich Nietzsche, was justified in teaching that biological truth demands the total rejection of the law of sympathy in favour of unqualified adherence to the law of natural selection. We must ask ourselves whether the law of sympathy is not as clearly inculcated as any other by biological facts, and whether it is not high time that, if indeed democracy be suffering from a perversion and one-sided representation of the truth, some one with eloquence and genius shall arise to publish in every quarter of the earth the supreme truth which emerges from the study of biology—the truth that the sanctions of morality are older than all the creeds and all the churches, and are to be heard proclaimed in trumpet tones by Nature herself.

CHAPTER XIII

CONSERVATISM AND LIBERALISM

SOCIOLOGY, as conceived by Professor Henry Sidgwick, was practically equivalent to the science of politics, though perhaps of somewhat wider scope. And certainly the sociologist is a politician—he is inclined to assert that no one else is entitled to the name; but it is not here proposed to devote a special chapter to anything that may be conceived under the special name of politics. Still less do I purpose to discuss party politics, or the merits of the party system in the government of a democratic people.

What I propose is merely to offer a few considerations based upon the conventional meaning of the party names in common use. Mr. Gilbert's sentry reflected upon the fact that—

Every little boy or gal
That's born into the world alive,
Is either a little Liberal
Or else a little Conservative,

and we may inquire into the truth and deeper meaning of this assertion.

Though it would be as easy as useless to demonstrate the fashion in which the Conservative and Liberal parties of the day belie their designations, we recognise that the first stands for conservation and the second for innovation. In their extreme forms (with which, as essentially morbid, we are not here concerned), Conservatism is against all change, being

convinced that the present order is the best,¹ whilst Liberalism is “ agin’ the Government,” and all convention and tradition and established things. The first asserts that whatever is, is right, the second, that whatever is, is wrong. But in the sane forms in which we shall study them, the Conservative individuals in any society devote their special attention to the important function of holding fast to that which is good. Being on the whole, no doubt, the “stupid party,” the Conservatives are gifted with appreciation rather than imagination; but though their function is perhaps akin to that of the “drag on the wheel,” it is all-important to the welfare of the car of state. On the other hand, the Liberal individuals in any society are at one with Carlyle—himself very far from being a Liberal—when he speaks of “that divine word reform.” They incline to leave reverence to the Conservatives: for themselves, they hold that it may lead to stagnation.

The wisest recognise that each party sees one aspect of the truth, but that the ideal is to see both. The wisest are not either Liberal or Conservative, but each on due occasion.

Here, also, we find an analogy of deep significance between the social and the individual organism. In the history of individuals we have had occasion to dwell upon two all-important conditions—which there is no harm in calling forces if we are not misled by a symbol—heredity and variation. Heredity is the Conservative force, tending, like the Con-

¹ Cf. the Duke of Rutland’s aspiration—

“ Let wealth and learning, laws and commerce die,
But leave us still our old nobility.”

servatives of any society, towards the holding fast of that which is good ; whilst natural selection, in both cases, fulfils the prior injunction to "prove all things." But the conserving force of heredity cannot originate. That function—equally important and far more brilliant—is left to its correlative, variation, the analogue of the Liberal forces of society. Natural variation is neutral and without any sign of purpose or "final causes"; it experiments blindly in all directions. But social variation, initiated by the Liberal forces of society, should be of a higher order, since it is guided not by mechanical laws, but by intelligence, and since it "knows what it wants." If Liberalism or variation were unbalanced by Conservatism or heredity, there could be no stability of the individual or social type. There would simply be an endless series of futile, because ephemeral, modifications : ephemeral, because there would be nothing to perpetuate them, nothing to hold them fast. Recognising these self-evident facts, the sociologist, whatever opinions he may hold as to the intellectual superiority of Liberalism or Conservatism, is convinced that both are absolutely essential. And he proceeds to study society with a view to distinguishing those forces or institutions or individuals which tend to make for perpetuation, and those which tend to make for innovation.

In comparing the sexes, the sociologist inclines to the view that the less intellectual sex is the more inclined to the function of conservation. Until quite recently, it was thought that, in the physical realm, women were less variable than men ;

but Professor Karl Pearson has lately shown that, in this regard, no difference between the sexes can be distinguished. Nevertheless, it may still be maintained that, in the realm of ideas—which, after all, are the great social forces—women are more Conservative, that is to say, less variable, than men. As a sex, they are less inclined to the acceptance of new ideas, less apt to accept the new for the sake of its novelty, more apt to be content with what was “good enough” for their fathers.

In all times and places, women are the chief allies and adherents of those social institutions which make for Conservatism. They are always the chief supporters of the established religion. We may, perhaps, incline to the view that it is their innate Conservatism that makes them supporters of the “Establishment,” rather than their religion which makes them Conservative; but, doubtless, each reacts on and fortifies the other.

The chief Conservative force in every society is its religion. From the impartial point of view of the sociologist, who attempts, like Plato, to be a spectator of all time and all existence, and who, when he speaks of religion, is not exclusively thinking of any particular religion, even the highest, this Conservative function is, perhaps, the most important that any ecclesiastical institution performs. Every religion insists upon the peculiar authenticity of its origin and the essential finality of its pronouncements. The official exponents of every religion have everything to gain and nothing to lose by Conservatism. Every religion inclines to teach that it has already proved all things, and that nothing

remains save to hold fast to that which it has proved to be good and true. Every religion goes even further. It invents a special name for variation, and, on the assumption that, perfection having been already attained, all variation in belief and practice must be bad, it calls such variation *heresy*, and condemns it outright. Whenever it has the power it suppresses the heretic, if possible, with such accompaniments as will serve "pour encourager les autres." The founder of every religion was a heretic.

It is writ large in universal history that discontent and doubt are the seeds of all moral and intellectual and social progress. Dr. William Barry could have paid no greater compliment to the men and women whom he discusses in his recent book than in calling them "heralds of revolt," for all progress is by revolt; all originality is revolt. Heredity and variation are both necessary in the evolution of living matter; and so are their analogues, conformity and nonconformity, in the evolution of society. But of these nonconformity or Liberalism has the distinction which depends upon the fact that all conformity is but conformity to a previous nonconformity, as all heredity is but inheritance of a previous variation. Hence the phrase "divine discontent"; and the uncharacteristic inadequacy of Matthew Arnold's remarks concerning the "dissidence of dissent."

Thus the greatest of all Protestants (that is, persons who protest), in the most important of all matters, was the Founder of the Christian religion. After him, in the supreme sphere of morals, may be named a mighty host—Isaiah, the Buddha, Socrates, Savonarola. These were men indeed, for

Emerson has told us that "whoso would be a man must be a nonconformist." And here, as elsewhere, the law of universal rhythm is observed. The typical history of the Dissenter or Protestant or Liberal or Nonconformist, of whom these are the greatest, is as inevitable as it is familiar. To begin with, he is in a minority of one. Convention, which cannot crush the new truth of which he is the protagonist, can at any rate make short work of *him*. Its weapons are the cross, hemlock, or the stake. Thereafter, the truth which made him free survives in a more or less degenerate form to enslave his followers. There arises an organisation, claiming to speak and act with authority. To its adherents it denies that exercise of private judgment which led to its foundation. They must conform to the traditional nonconformity, which, however, being interpreted by men of smaller calibre, is always somewhat of a travesty of the original. Later, there arises another great Liberal, filled with divine discontent, and the whole process is repeated. Those academic heroes who decry Herbert Spencer to-day are the intellectual descendants of the men who called Socrates a corrupter of youth, and their descendants will deny some new truth a century hence because it cannot be reconciled with some page of the Synthetic Philosophy.

Thus the history of the ideas which sway society is in nowise dissimilar. Each advance originates with an individual who dares to doubt that which satisfied his grandparents and satisfies his contemporaries. To him and them alike were taught certain assertions which had once aroused fierce

opposition from the contented supporters of the assertions which *they* displaced. But the dissenter—an Aristotle, a Copernicus, a Darwin—was not so easily satisfied. Where others believed, finding the belief, like all conformity, conducive to ease and reputation, he doubted—and of the doubt was born a new light. In order to be answered it is necessary to put a question. Just as Catholicism was founded by a Protestant—in the fine original sense—so are philosophic and sociological systems founded by sceptics. But a little while, and all who would gain the immediate prizes of intellectual effort must conform to the new nonconformity. There is thus always a soul of evil in things good. For centuries the authority of Aristotle—supported by the Church—arrested all intellectual progress. For many decades the authority of Newton, lent to the emission or corpuscular theory of light, obstructed the way to acceptance of the undulatory theory. To-day the authority of Darwin is interfering with the proper appreciation of factors in organic evolution other than natural selection. As in the sphere of morals, the interpreters or first conformists are always unable properly to transmit the message of the nonconformist. Newton decided only tentatively, and with reservations, in favour of the corpuscular theory of light; Darwin expressly recognised the existence of other factors in organic evolution besides that which he had himself discovered. One can no more blame these nonconformists for the misguided conformity of their followers, than one can blame the Greatest of all Protestants for the state of the mediæval Church.

CHAPTER XIV

SOCIETY AND MORALITY

BUT whilst we admit that every orthodoxy was once a heresy, we must not fall into the egregious error of imagining every orthodoxy to be erroneous, or to require immediate repudiation. If this error is dangerous anywhere, it is in the sphere of morals. Only in the presence of morality can any society exist; and we may freely admit the contention of those who therefore augur no good to society from the present state of discredit into which many moral sanctions have fallen. The circumstance that morality is constantly confused with religion, and the fact that morality has been asserted to be based on religious dogmas, has led to something not far short of a crisis, in consequence of that "re-interpretation of dogma"—to state the case in the mildest terms—which is unquestionably *the* intellectual fact of our time.

The liberal forces which I have praised at such length are now threatening, by their success, to destroy the balance which should exist between them and the forces of conservation. Men are forgetting to hold fast to that which is good: and morality, which preceded all the creeds, and is the most perdurable of things—is in temporary danger. But it will not suffice merely to assert that the danger is temporary. Those who believe that the principles of morality are based on the "foundations of the world," and who believe that the present danger, due to the "re-interpretation" or abandon-

ment of certain dogmas, can and must be averted, "are called on to do something in pursuance of their belief."¹

The student of the higher sciences does assuredly believe that morality is no superstition, as Nietzsche thought, or convention, as many have asserted, or device for gaining infinite future riches at small cost, as religious systems tend to assert. It is in this belief that the preceding pages and volumes have been written, and, if they have not utterly failed, the reader will accompany me to the consideration, in the succeeding volume, of the manner in which the study of biology and psychology and sociology teaches us that there are principles of ethics, grounded in the nature of things, and that it is their discovery and establishment which constitute the chief end and glory of these sciences.

ADDENDUM

THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY

THE reader has not gathered from the preceding pages any impression that sociology is a science which, like the older astronomy, can claim to be perfect save in minutiae. He has seen, I hope, that our young science is in need of far more research than has hitherto been devoted to it: whilst he recognises, on the other hand, that the gentlemen who sit in Parliament or otherwise amuse themselves with polities, might be of even more

¹ Preface to Herbert Spencer's "Data of Ethics."

value to the public than at present, if they made the acquaintance of certain elementary sociological facts. But amongst Members of Parliament there are, of course, one or two thinkers who, in happier deliberative conditions than those that now attain, might even leaven the lump. Amongst these is Mr. James Bryce, who has hitherto consented to discharge the presidential duties of the Sociological Society recently formed in this country. Let us for a moment consider the nature of the gap which this Society has sought to fill. The conception that societies and their ways are fit objects for scientific study, since they exhibit the action of *law*, and are not ruled by caprice or chance or even man's variable will, is now two generations old. This alone of all the sciences is in a special sense everybody's business, and it is peculiarly the business of the Anglo-Saxon. Yet in no leading country on earth is sociology or the scientific or philosophic as distinguished, let us say, from the armchair study of society, so backward as in this country, which, from Hobbes and Locke to Spencer and Galton, has contributed far more than any other to implicit or explicit sociology. The present chapter is written in order to noise abroad, so far as may be, the recent recognition of this great science in the heart of the Empire which is in most need of it, and which offers to its citizens opportunities never paralleled in history for the study of society in all stages of development.

Until some eighteen months ago the Edinburgh School of Sociology, founded by Professor Patrick Geddes, was, so far as I know, the only institution

of its kind in this country. When, largely owing to his initiative and to the munificence of another Scotsman, Mr. Martin White, the Sociological Society was founded in London, many people thought that here was another debating club whose activities would begin and end with "palaver." Amongst those who thought this or something like it, and who therefore declined to join the Society, were Professor Karl Pearson and Mr. Francis Galton. However, the founder of biometrics and eugenics is now a member, and there is hope of Dr. Pearson.

The practical reader will ask, then, what has been *done*—not *said*—by the Society during its infancy, and I will tell him. The Society has held several meetings, and has heard at least three pioneer addresses which are contained, together with many valuable contributions from eminent Continental thinkers, in the volume of "Sociological Papers" to which I have already had frequent occasion to refer. Of course this is not "practical," but books have led to practice ere now. Then the Society has tempted from his retirement Mr. Francis Galton, probably the most illustrious of living biologists, who has started an inquiry into the best means of improving the human race, the last of which has by no means yet been heard.¹ Mr. Galton has endowed the University of London for the foundation of a Francis Galton Fellowship in National Eugenics, to which a distinguished young Oxonian, Mr. Edgar Schuster, has recently been appointed. Further, the efforts of the Society

¹ See the chapter, "The Future Evolution of Man," in the volume "Organic Evolution."

have succeeded in persuading the University of London to remove the reproach long commented upon by Continental and American observers, that sociology was absolutely unrepresented by so much as a lectureship, let alone a chair, in any one of the sixteen universities of these islands. The Society is proud to number amongst its Council the distinguished native of Finland, Dr. Westermarck, who now lectures on Sociology in the University of London. The beneficence of Mr. Martin White has enabled the University to organise the first academic lectures on sociology ever delivered in this country, and, quite recently, sociology was formally recognised as one of the subjects qualifying for the science degree of the University. Sanguine observers hope that, since an annual Herbert Spencer lecture is now delivered before the University of Oxford, that ancient and glorious institution may think fit, ere the century is out, to accord due recognition to the science of which the Greek Aristotle—after all—is probably the veritable founder.¹

Lastly, in reference to *work done* or doing, let me allude to the recent report of the Committee on Physical Deterioration, probably the most important official document of the last decade, as every one will admit who remembers the relation between mind and body, and the truth that empires are

¹ Plato had his schemes of eugenics and his Utopia, but he was guiltless of the scientific method. His great pupil, Aristotle, on the other hand, anticipated the much derided "Descriptive Sociology" of Herbert Spencer, now in process of completion, in his *Politeiai*, which contained a descriptive history of the constitutions, manners, and usages of one hundred and fifty-eight states!

founded upon men—or upon shifting mud. The Sociological Society is now consorting with other bodies interested in this problem, and is determined that medical inspection of schools shall be presented to the consideration of the Government as the most necessary and urgent recommendation in the Committee's report. Fortunately, it is known that, though there is abundant departmental jealousy to contend against, yet the most influential members of the Government, notably including the Premier himself, are fully aware of the grave imperial importance of this question, and may be trusted to see that conviction issues in action. So much, then, for the theory that the Society was only a device for securing "pleasant afternoon chats" for its members.

And now, perhaps, I may refer at greater length to this volume, "Sociological Papers," which is without any predecessor in this country. To such papers as that of Professor Westermarck, on "Women in Early Civilisation," I have already freely helped myself, and will here make no further reference, for my desire is to convince the reader that sociology is capable not only of treatment as an academic study, unperturbed by the needs of men and the grim facts of life, but is precisely the science which provides the ethical justification of all other sciences, in that it is the means by which they may be, and increasingly will be, applied to everybody's business; for no one can escape being a practical sociologist save by committing suicide or emulating Alexander Selkirk.

We are coming to realise that two broad terms,

heredity and environment, or nature and nurture, cover all the factors which determine the lives of men and societies. Now, these are broadly met by two sections of this volume. Professor Geddes and those who debate with him have here dealt at length with Civics, or the study of cities and citizens. Whoso knows, even in small measure, what Professor Geddes has done for Edinburgh, in preserving noble and ancient buildings, in adding to its physical beauty and in nurturing the corporate life of its University, wherein every colony and dependency of this Empire is numerously represented, will be prepared to listen to the words of the founder of Nature-Study in this regard. I will not give my opinion of the value of Professor Geddes' paper, but will quote that of the pioneer who has devoted years of his life to an unprecedented and already classical study of the greatest city of any age. Let it suffice that the Right Hon. Charles Booth said, "The paper we have just heard read is one of the most complete and charming papers on a great and interesting subject I have ever read." Here I cannot epitomise what Mr. Booth calls the "wealth of ideas" contained in these few pages; but there they are for study by the serious citizen of many decades to come.

Now Civics, you will observe, is the broadest study of that great social factor, the *environment*.

It is complemented by an equally fundamental study of the other factor, *heredity*. This comes from Mr. Galton, whose writings during the past forty years have been an inspiration to so many of the two generations following his own. To this

master of original ideas we owe a word now familiar and indeed popular in America, the word Stiriculture. This is good enough, but in coining the term Eugenics, which will one day be at least as familiar as politics, Mr. Galton has done better. In his own words, "The aim of Eugenics is to bring as many influences as can reasonably be employed to cause the useful [in the highest as well as other senses] classes in the community to contribute *more* than their proportion to the next generation." Some people still think that "natural selection," the great discovery of Mr. Galton's immortal cousin, is a cruel and merciless law of nature; but we have seen that it is, and ever has been, beneficent. My illustrious friend now merely proposes that man shall utilise the revelation of this law by such measures as, without any injury to the precious things, like healthy sentiment and marriage, shall expedite the process, so that each generation shall arise up and call its predecessor blessed for the forethought and altruism which decided that the force called heredity—careless as to the ethical value of that which it perpetuates—should be directed so as to prove wholly beneficent. If this project sounds hopeless, chimerical, or visionary to any reader of the chapter in another volume to which a reference has already been given, let him study the original paper and the distinguished opinions expressed upon it. And if he feels inclined to decry eugenics or any other sociological proposal, let him ask whether reason and experience are not against the view that the "happy-go-lucky" or "muddling through" method

is the best for the conduct of human affairs. If, indeed, this were the best way, how and why did the human intellect come to be evolved?

The most recent project of the Sociological Society will, I hope, prove to be potent in bringing home to the English mind the idea that there is a science of society. Supported by the University of London, the Society has invited the International Institute of Sociology, which has its headquarters in Paris, to hold its next Congress in London next summer, and the invitation has been accepted. The systematic study of sociology is far more advanced across the Channel than here, and we may expect a real awakening to the importance of the subject as a consequence of next summer's Congress.

The Honorary Secretary of the Sociological Society is Mr. Victor V. Branford, M.A., whose offices are at 5 Old Queen Street, Westminster, and who will be most happy to correspond with any reader whom I have succeeded in interesting. The subscription to the Society is one guinea; but those who find it impossible, for one reason or another, to express their interest in the subject by joining the Society, may indirectly benefit from its work, since many debating societies at the universities and elsewhere have lately discovered the advantages of affiliation to the Society, and since its papers are annually published, and will be stocked by the libraries if their customers demand them.

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